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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the continuing threat of a serious
oil supply disruption and readiness of the U.S. to cope with
such a development. Chapter One examines current perceptions
of the likelihood of another oil crisis. It argues that
these perceptions are critically flawed by an inadequate
conceptual understanding of the nature of vulnerability.
Chapter Two traces the U.S. response to the 1973-74 and
1978-79 oil crises and surveys the prospects for a future oil
crisis. Chapter Three evaluates the present oil glut in
relation to the U.S. long-term programs to reduce oil vul-
nerability. It examines the effect that a new complacent
attitude arising from the appearance of surplus may have on
efforts to promote policies to avert a future crisis.
Chapter Four examines the different contingencies that the
U.S. could possibly face as a result of oil dependence.
Chapter Five examines U.S. national goals and the linkage
between goals and policy. Chapter Six proposes a strategy of
attainment to reduce U.S. vulnerability to future oil dis-
ruptions. Such a strategy would address both the short and
long-term problems that face American strategic planners
concerned with the oil issue. Specifically, this strategy
of attainment will evaluate the physical and political
constraints involved in implementing the plan and will
4

address the free market approach to energy security and the
real possibility of exploiting shale oil reserves to meet
U.S. national interest. Chapter Seven concludes that the
present oil glut is not a long-term phenomenom and immediate
implementation of this strategic plan is necessary in order
to mitigate the effects of an oil interruption.
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I. CURRENT PERCEPTIONS OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF
ANOTHER OIL CRISIS
A. INTRODUCTION
Two times in the 1970 ' s the United States faced a crisis
because of developments in the world oil market. In 1973
the Arab oil embargo demonstrated that the U.S. was
unprepared for the withdrawal of large sources of oil
supply. In 1978 the Iranian crisis demonstrated the situa-
tion was even more serious because the U.S. had become more
dependent on foreign oil than 1973, One of the main goals
of this thesis is to assess the likelihood of another
sudden crisis.
The significant threat which could cause another crisis
is the withdrawal of a large source of supply at a time when
substitution possibilities are very limited. The degree to
which this threat is taken seriously is dependent upon the
perceived vulnerability associated with foreign oil imports.
One of the key issues in assessing the likelihood of another
crisis is determining the degree of oil dependence and
vulnerability. The apparent lack of a clear understanding
of dependence and vulnerability has contributed to false
hopes of security and reduced the willingness of American
officials to aggressively commit resources to costly stra-
tegies designed to increase America's energy self-sufficiency
14

To analyze the nature of the threat a clear under-
standing of what is meant by oil dependence and vulner-
ability is needed. Such an understanding can help us to
evaluate the current belief that the United States has
enhanced its ability to cope with a future critical point
because the threat has been mitigated as a result of the
oil glut reducing dependence and vulnerability.
B. FALSE PERCEPTIONS OF THE OIL THREAT
Editorials, articles in professional journals, and
headlines in daily newspapers have recently had a common
theme: OPEC is in serious trouble and there appears to be
plenty of surplus oil in a situation that is commonly being
called an "Oil Glut." This oil glut appears to be signi-
fying a time whereby the United States can relax a little
as our vulnerability seems to be reduced. Headlines such
as "OPEC Knuckles Under" [Ref. 1]; "The Unrigging of Oil
Prices" [Ref. 2]; "OPEC in Disarray: What it Means"
[Ref. 3]; are being read by numerous people who are
getting the distinct impression that the future of a crisis
ridden oil industry seems quite bright.
A typical editorial of this period written by Donald
K. White of the San Francisco Chronicle is entitled "The
Oil Glut: Getting Even with the Arabs" [Ref. 4]. He writes,
"Isn't it great to watch those Arabs as they worry about
the drop in crude oil prices? Remember those days in the
15

mid-70 's when we had to line up at gas stations to buy
gas at ever increasing prices? Someday, we said, we'll
show those Arabs."
William Tucker has written an article entitled "The
Energy Crisis is Over!" [Ref. 5] He writes, "Few people
seem to realize the OPEC's monopoly of the market lasted
only about 3 years... But, as always, the success of a
monopoly was also its undoing... We have ended OPEC's
dominance of the market within a few short months by
swallowing what turned out to be a relatively mild pill
and accepting a market price for our own oil."
These quotations illustrate a commonly held belief
today that oil and vulnerability dependence has been re-
duced because of OPEC's troubles and the present oil
glut. Unfortunately, this belief arises from the fact
that people do not have an understanding of the threat.
They feel that the threat is measured in the amount of oil
available. If a surplus of oil exists, then the threat
of a future oil crisis must be less because plenty of oil
is available. As will be demonstrated, this myopic view
of the threat clearly shows a lack of understanding of oil
dependence and oil vulnerability.
C. NATURE OF OIL DEPENDENCE AND VULNERABILITY
Dependence means a situation in which the United States
can be significantly affected by external forces and
16

interdependence means mutual dependence between the
United States and another state or organization, i.e.,
U.S. and OPEC states. We must be careful not to think
of interdependence entirely in terms of situations of
evenly balanced mutual dependence. As in the case of OPEC,
it is asymmetries in dependence that are most likely to
provide sources of influence. In their dealings with the
United States less dependent actors like OPEC can often
use the interdependent relationship as a source of power
in bargaining over an issue and perhaps to affect other
issues, i.e., the use of the oil weapon in 1973 against the
United States. At the other extreme from pure symmetry is
pure dependence; but it too is rare. Most cases lie
between these two extremes.
Power can be thought of as the ability of an actor
like OPEC to get others to do something they otherwise
would not do. To understand the role of power in inter-
dependence, we must distinguish between two dimensions,
sensitivity dependence and vulnerability dependence. As
will be argued below, it is the failure to understand the
distinction between sensitivity dependence and vulnerability
dependence that has contributed to the many false assump-
tions being made about oil security.
This section draws heavily on Joseph Nye and Robert




Sensitivity involves degrees of change within a policy
framework—how much change in one country is caused by
changes in another, and how great are the costly effects?
Sensitivity interdependence is created by interactions
within a framework of policies. Sensitivity assumes that
the framework remains unchanged. An example of sensitivity
dependence is the way U.S. was affected by increased oil
prices in 1973 and 1978. Sensitivity was a function of the
greater cost of foreign oil and the proportion of petroleum
the United States imported. Most people were able to
recognize that the United States during these two critical
points of 1973 and 1978 as sensitive to changes in the
supply and price of imported oil. Sensitivity could be
easily measured by the increase in inflation and long lines
at gasoline stations. This high sensitivity led to the
belief that the United States vulnerability was also high.
Vulnerability dependence considers what the situation
would be if the framework of policies could be changed.
For example, if more alternatives were available, and new
and very different policies were possible, what would be the
costs of adjusting to the outside change? In petroleum,
for instance, what matters is not only the proportion of
one's needs that is imported, but the alternatives to
imported energy and the cost of pursuing those alternatives.
Two countries, each importing 35 percent of their petroleum
needs, may seem equally sensitive to price rise; but if one
18

could shift to domestic sources at moderate cost, and the
other had no such alternative, the second state would be
more vulnerable than the first. Thus vulnerability
dependence would be defined as the difference between the
cost of accepting sensitivity and the cost of adopting an
alternative energy policy which would reduce sensitivity.
In terms of the costs of dependence, sensitivity means
liability to costly effects imposed from outside considering
only the effect energy policies are having at that point in
time, not what energy policies can possibly accomplish
sometime in the future. Vulnerability cost is measured in
the willingness in reducing potential sensitivity cost.
The time involved in implementing policy changes to reduce
vulnerability may be lengthy, therefore one should view
vulnerability over a period of time as opposed to
sensitivity which is always taken from a point in time.
This very important distinction between sensitivity and
vulnerability allows us to measure vulnerability in an
indirect way. Measurement of vulnerability dependence may
be more difficult because of the time involved in
implementing policy changes. Even though corrective
policies may have been instituted, each policy will take
a different amount of time before it is fully implemented
and effective in reducing vulnerability. However, one





As noted earlier, it is a failure to understand the
distinction between sensitivity dependence and vulner-
ability dependence which has contributed to false hopes
regarding America's long run energy security. The problem
is that people can recognize sensitivity dependence as
being high when outside changes are causing negative changes
in the United States, i.e., high unemployment, inflation,
etc. However, people do not recognize sensitivity depen-
dence as being high when outside changes are causing posi-
tive changes in the United States since people usually
assume that vulnerability dependence is high only when a
negative sensitivity dependence is high. Unfortunately
they do not recognize that a positive sensitivity depen-
dence can mean a high vulnerability dependence.
Today, sensitivity dependence in the U.S. is still
very high because as the price of oil dropped and the
supply of oil increased positive changes were seen, i.e.,
reduced inflation in G.N. P. However, this high sensitivity
dependence should indicate to people that our vulnerability
dependence is also probably high. As seen earlier, by the
editorials, people do not seem to perceive that sensitivity
dependence is high because it is positive. In order to
demonstrate that there is a correlation between a high
(positive) sensitivity dependence and high vulnerability
dependence it will be necessary to measure vulnerability
dependence. The question then becomes, if sensitivity
20

dependence is high, how high is the degree of vulnerability
dependence in the United States? As noted earlier, vul-
nerability dependence is more difficult to measure and will
be dealt with in the remaining sections of this chapter
and in chapters Two, Three, and Four.
D. STRATEGIC LINK BETWEEN OIL AND U.S. SECURITY
When analyzing the American vulnerability, it is impor-
tant to establish the link between oil and security. In
this respect, the critical question is: what quantities of
oil at what cost are considered sufficient? As noted in
Table 1, the U.S. derives 50 percent of its energy from




The Importance of Oil as a Source of Energy
1979
U.S. West. Europe Japsin
Oil as a percentage of 47 55 73
total energy consumed
Percent of oil imported 48 96 100
Percent of oil imported 33 61 72
from Persian Gulf
Percent Gulf oil as a 8 32 53
percent of total energy
consumed
Source: Collins Proceedings p. 80, December 1981
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The most Important trend in U.S. energy use (See
Figure 1) has been the growing importance of petroleum as


































Soufce- Doveloped from Mineral Yearbook. 1965 through 1975, Bureau of Mines,
-
S. Oeoanment of the interior (Washington, D.C.: GPO). Adapted from
*<ovv3rd Buci^nell, "Energy and Nationai Security: A Status Report," Energy
C.jrvrnjnications 5, no. 4 (1979). By permission of Marcel Dekker, Inc. (1 quad
" 0.5 mbpd oil equivalent).
Figure 1 Growth of Energy Demand in the United States
Table 2 shows that petroleum as a percentage of total
energy consumption over the last twenty years has been
significant. Presently the U.S. is the world's largest
importer of oil. In 1982 foreign oil accounted for 33
22

percent of all the oil Americans used and 28 percent as of
mid-1983 [Ref. 6], Most energy analysts assume that
the single most important source of energy for the U.S.
over the next decade will continue to be oil [Ref. 7].
TABLE 2
U.S. Energy Consumption: 1960-1981
Energy Consumption Petroleum an % of Total

















Source: Department of Energy, Energy Information Adminis-
tration Annual Report to Congress, 1980, Vol. 2 Energy
Review, February 1982; U.S. Council of Economic Advisors,
Economic Report of the President , 1982
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As the demand for oil increased and with cheap foreign
oil becoming available, the United States began to rely more
and more on imported oil. Table 3 shows the increase in net
imports as a percent of consumption. Table 3 also points
out the significant fact that when the 1979 oil crisis
occurred, the U.S. had become even more dependenx upon
imported oil since the 1973 oil crisis. Before 1973 net
imports were only 28 percent of domestic consumption. By
1977 net imports had risen to about 46 percent of domestic
consumption. From the 1973 oil crisis to just before the
1978 oil crisis, the U.S. had increased net imports as a
percent of consumption by 18 percent.
Since the 1978 crisis the oil import level has remained
relatively high as compared to the pre-1973 levels. In 1982
net imports of oil accounted for 33% of the total oil con-
sumed in the United States. In 1983 net imports dropped
slightly to 28% which is equal to the pre-1973 import per-
centage of 28% [Ref. 8].
As demonstrated, oil has played a significant role in
the United States as an important energy source. The ques-
tion becomes: Will oil continue to play a significant role
in the future? The following three tables are presented to
give a wide range of oil demand predictions from several
credible sources. The purpose of having several predictions
is to assess the general trend from the experts. The under-




Oil Import Trend; 1960-1977







1960 3,586 2,916 644 74 16
1961 3,641 2,983 700 64 17
1962 3,796 3,049 760 61 18
1963 3,921 3,154 775 76 18
1964 4,034 3,029 827 74 19
1965 4,202 3,290 901 68 20
1966 4,411 3,496 939 72 20
1967 4,584 3,730 926 112 18
1968 4,902 3,883 1,039 84 19
1969 5,160 3,956 1,155 85 21
1970 5,364 4,129 1,248 94 22
1971 5,553 4,078 1,433 82 24
1972 5,990 4,103 1,735 81 • 28
1973 6,317 4,006 2,283 84 35
1974 6,078 3,832 2,231 80 35
1975 5,958 3,667 2,210 76 36
1976 6,391 3,577 2,676 82 41
1977 6,712 3,636 3,169 83 46
Source: U.S., Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines,
Minerals and Materials, February 1978, p. 19.
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to be an important energy source and that oil imports are
expected to rise above the pre-1973 oil crisis level.
TABLE 4
1982 U.S. Demand and Consumption
Total Consumption Imports Percent
15.3 5.0 33%
TABLE 5
U.S. Oil Outlook for the Future











1960 7.9 9.8 1.9 19
1965 8.8 11.4 2.6 23
1970 11.1 14.5 3.4 23
1975 10.0 15.8 5.8 37
1980 10.4 17.0-20.0 7.0-10.0 41-50
1985 10.9 18.0-22.0 7.0-11.0 39-50
1990 11.4 20.0-25.0 9.0-14.0 45-56




U.S. Oil Outlook for the Future
Millions of Barrels Per Day
1985 1990








Minus Projected Supply of




Projected Oil Imports 10.1 11.3
Source: The World Oil Market in the 1980 's; Implications









U.S. Oil Outlook for the Future



























15.6 17.3 17.8 19.9
10.0 8.9 10.2 8.6
5.6 8.4 7.6 11.3
Sources:
EIA: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Adminis-
tration, Annual Report to Congress for 1979 , (DOE/EIA-0173-
79/3.
Shell Oil Company: The National Energy Outlook 1980-1990 ,
August 1980.
PIRF: Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, Inc., Oil in
the U.S. , Energy Perspective; A Forecast to 1990 , May,
1980.
CBO: Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget




As Tables 5, 6, and 7, show the projected demand for
imported oil through 1990 will be increasing
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Oil demand in the U.S. is currently 15.3 mmb/d and has
been forecast to remain at least that level with projections
stating the level could rise to 19-20 mmb/d by 1990. The
U.S. oil import dependence is about 5 mmb/d (33%) and
projected to rise to 11-14 mmb/d by 1990 (39%-56%).
In sum, the experts predict that petroleum is a prime
source of energy that is expected to increase in importance.
What makes petroleum unique is that it cannot be quickly
replaced.
E. VULNERABILITY DEPENDENCE: OBJECTIVE ANALYST
Now that it has been established that the United States
will continue to depend on oil to meet its future energy
needs, it is important to explore the United States energy
policies and the overall effect they have had in reducing
the potential cost imposed by outside actions, i.e.,
dependence vulnerability. As noted earlier, dependence
vulnerability is defined as the difference between the cost
of accepting sensitivity and the cost of adopting an
alternative energy policy which would reduce sensitivity.
A reduced vulnerability would be indicated by the
ability of the United States to alter its oil dependency
situation by changes in oil policies. An unchanged vulner-
ability would be indicated by the U.S.'s lack of ability to
alter its situation through policy changes. This section
will not examine each policy change (refer to chapter Two
29

for a review of policy changes) but only review the results
of the policy changes to determine the degree in which
they have reduced potential cost imposed by external
change.
1. Domestic Petroleum Production
This section will review the results the policy
changes have had in increasing U.S. domestic production to
reduce the cost imposed by external change. Table 8 com-
pares the projections to total domestic liquids production
for 1985 and 1990. (Total domestic liquids production
figures in Table 7 include crude oil, enhanced recovery,
natural gas liquids, Alaskan production, shale oil, and
synthetic liquids). The important point to note in Table
7 is that domestic production is predicted to decline over
the next several years.
PE ' s Best Estimate case is approximately 0.7 mmb/d
per day lower in 1985, and 0.8 mmb/d lower in 1990,
than similar projections made in February of 1980. Total
domestic production is lower in 1985 and 1990 because of a
reduction in the assumed conventional lower 48 states
resource base.
Figure 2 depicxs production, reserve additions, and
proven reserves of crude oil from 1950 to 2000. Prior to
1966, the level of proven reserves grew as reserve additions
exceeded conventional production. However, growing demand




Forecasts of Total Domestic Oil Production




PE Base Forecast 10.2 8.8 8.7
EIA 10.2 9.2 9.6
PFGEP 10.2 9.59.5
Exxon 10.2 8.1 7.1
Sources:
PE: Reducing U.S. Oil Vulnerability Prepared by Assis-
tant Secretary or Policy and Evaluation, U. S. Department
of Energy, November 10, 1980.
EIA: Projections from EIA's Annual Report to Congress,
1978, and Annual Report to Congress, 1979, Chapter 4,
Medium Price Case.
PFGEP: Policy and Fiscal Guidance Energy Projections,
OAS/PE/DOE, February 1980.
















1950 1960 1970 1980
rear
1990 2000
Figure 2 Lower-48 Conventional Oil Production Proven Re-
serves and Reserve Additions^
Projection are for the Best Estimate case. World oil
prices are assumed to be $34/barrel in 1980, $38/barrel in
1985 and $43/barrel in 1990; and continuation of current
energy policies and programs, including oil decontrol and
windfall profit tax. Historical values taken from EIA 1979
Annual Report to Congree Vol. II.
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to reverse the situation in mid-1960 's. During the past 16
years, reserve additions have fallen consistently short of
petroleum needs. Consequently, proven reserves have been
steadily declining, leading to a fall-off in production
[Ref. 9].
It is apparent upon examination of Figure 2 that
the root of the U.S. energy proglem lies in the inability of
conventional lower-48 states crude oil production to meet
the future demand for petroleum products. Unfortunately,
production of lower-48 crude has been falling since 1970,
and the trend is projected to continue in the future.
Decline of lower 48 state production is the reason why the
experts in Table 7 have predicted domestic production to
decline in 1985 and again in 1990.
The prediction of falling production of domestic
oil made in Figure 2 is directly linked to the projected
level of proven oil reserves, which determines the capacity
to produce oil in any given year. Due to geological and
technical limitations, oil producers cannot exploit more
than 10 to 15 percent of existing reserves in a given year.
Proven reserves are increased over time by adding each
year's new discoveries, and revisions and extensions, and
are decreased by the yearly amount of production. Since
reserve additions are the key determinant of future con-
ventional production, one has to examine the rate at which
they are being found to understand why the domestic
33

production in lower 48 states is predicted to decline (see
Table 8). The best indicator for potential reserve
additions would be to look at the trend in drilling
activity [Ref. 10].
Figure 3 depicts historical and projected drilling
activity and returns-to-drilling for crude oil deposits in
the continental United States. Historical drilling acti-
vity peaked in 1956 at 200 million feet per year, and then
declined until 1973. Since then, total drilling activity
for oil has been increasing steadily, largely as a result
of higher world oil prices. Concomitant with this increased
drilling activity, however, there has been a steep decline
in the amount of oil discovered per foot drilled, i.e.,
returns-to-drilling. Returns-to-drilling have, on the
average, been roughly a factor of 1.5-2 smaller in the past
5 years (1974-1979) when compared to the 5 years preceding
that (1969-1974). The Department of Energy has recently
stated, "that the easy oil has been found so that most
deposits discovered in the future will be smaller and at
greater depths. These factors (barring some unforeseen
technological breakthrough) will cause a decline in drilling
productivity through time and an increase in the marginal
cost of new discoveries" [Ref. 11].
It was hoped that even though returns to drilling have
sharply declined, the vigorous increase in oil drilling






















new reserve additions. This hope seemed realistic largely
as a result of phased federal decontrol of the price of
crude oil beginning in April 1979 and of higher OPEC prices
that encouraged the oil industry to explore for new sources
of oil. At this time both exploratory and developmental




1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Average Number of
Rigs Operating 2,177 2,909 3,970 4,520 1,882
Source: Petroleum Supply Annual 1981, July 1982 Vol. 1,
p. 7 and Time, April 18, 1983, p. 71.
This increase beginning in 1979 halted in annual
decline in production in the lower 48 states that average
300 thousand barrels per day through the middle 1970 's
[Ref. 12].
However, the drilling for new oil sharply declined
in 1983. With oil prices sagging, companies have budgeted
$35.7 billion for drilling and exploration this year, which
is 14 percent less than in 1982 [Ref. 13]. In the field,
only 1,882 rigs were drilling in the U.S. in the first week
of April 1983 (see Table 9). That count was the lowest in
six years and nearly 60 percent below the December 1981
peak of more than 4,500 [Ref. 14].
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Reserve additions are expected to decline from 1980
to 1990. This assumption was made expecting that the
decline would be slowed by a projected increase of 5.5 to
6 percent in drilling activity that should take place as a
result of decontrol and higher world prices. With the
present trend of reduced drilling activity, the decline
in reserves will be even greater. The Department of Energy
believes that the decline in reserve additions from 1990
to 2000 will likely be greater than that in the 1980 to
1990 period as a result of even lower returns-to-drilling
and a falloff in drilling activity [Ref. 15]. As a result
of the very discouraging trend of decreased well drilling
and exploration, Middle East oil will continue to be
very important to the U.S.
2 . Importance of Middle East Oil
The reason Middle East Oil will remain important to
the United States is the fact that the world's reserves are
concentrated in a small number of countries in the Gulf
region. Presently there is estimated to be 551.6 billion
barrels of non-Communist world proved crude oil reserves.
The 362 billion barrels of reserves in the Middle East
represent over two-thirds of the non-Communist oil reserves.
The importance of proven reserves is that they are
major source of oil production in the short term (1 to 7
years). According to the American Petroleum Institute, the




Regional Distribution of Non-Communist Oil Reserves
Middle East 362 667o
North America 38 7%
United States 26 5%
Africa 57 lo;^
South America 26 5%
Europe 24 4%
Asia 19 3%
Source: World Petroleum Availability 1980-2000, October




estimated quantities of all liquids statistically defined as
crude oil, which geological and engineering data demonstrate
with reasonable certainty to be recoverable in future years
from known reservoirs under existing economic and operating
conditions" [Ref. 16].
With the majority of the non-Communist oil reserves
in the Middle East, at least in the short run, that area will
remain important. As an indicator of the enormous potential
in the Middle East, a Department of Energy study found that
the remaining Middle East reserves could be as high as 439
billion barrels and that substantial additional producing
capacity could be developed in known deposits in some of the
Persian Gulf producing countries [Ref. 17].
OPEC accounts for half the total world production
and 60 percent of free world oil production (See Table 11).
The United States was an early leader in oil production.
Until 1953 it produced more oil than all other countries
combined.
Compound annual rates of growth in production reveal
many interesting relationships (See Table 12). The growth
rate in the U.S. and in OPEC nations was less during the
1950 's than it was in the 1960 's, because output was re-
strained during the 1950 's by regulation of production
imposed by state authorities in the U.S. and by the inter-
national majors in the member countries of OPEC. Market




Average U.S. and OPEC Daily Oil Production: 1860-1980
Year U.S. OPEC Total World
1860 .00 .000 .001
1870 .014 .000 .016
1880 .072 .000 .082
1890 .126 .000 .210
1900 .174 .006 .409
1910 .574 .030 .898
1920 1.214 .084 1.887
1930 2.460 .659 3.868
1940 3.707 1.004 5.890
1950 5.407 3.432 10.419
1960 7.055 8.800 21.026
1970 9.648 23.408 43.210
1980 8.597 26.890 59.455
Source: American Petroleum Institute, Petroleum Facts and
Figures, 1971 ed
, pp. 548-557, Central Intelligence Agency,
Handbook of Economic Statistics, Washington, B.C. 1979
,







output and maintaining prices during the 1960 's. The growth
rate declined markedly during the 1970 's, as output was
once again restrained and demand slackened in response to
higher prices [Ref. 18].
TABLE 12
Compound Annual Growth Rates in Oil Production by Region
(In Percent)
Time Period United States OPEC World
1950-1960 2.7 9.4 7.4
1960-1970 3.1 9.8 7.2
1970-1980 -1.2 1.4 3.2
1950-1980 1.5 6.9 5.8
Source: Albert Danielsen, The Evolution of OPEC
,
p. 17.
Even though the U.S. and OPEC followed each other in
the production trends from 1950-1980, the major difference
is the production increase of OPEC.
In 1976, the Persian Gulf provided about 21.4 million
b/d of oil, representing 47 percent of non-Communist produc-
tion, or 37% of world production. Average production in
the Persian Gulf in 1976 was 7,228 b/d per well as compared
to an average of about 16 b/d in the U.S. In 1979 after a
serious decline in Iranian production, the Persian Gulf
provided 20.6 million b/d of oil, representing about 43
percent of free world production and 33 percent of world
production. What makes the Middle East reserves so
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appealing to the United States even though the area is so
politically unstable is that Persian Gulf production is
typified by high productivity, low production costs (lOc
to 250 per barrel for exploration and production), huge
reserves, and excellent access to marine shipping points
[Ref. 19].
The United States and its allies have become
heavily dependent on oil produced by OPEC, and particu-
larly on oil produced by the Persian Gulf members of OPEC
(See Table 13). U.S. oil imports from all sources in-
creased from about 1.8 million barrels per day, or 18 per-
cent of U.S. oil supply in 1960 to 8.8 mmb/d, or 48
percent of U.S. oil supply in 1977.
TABLE 13
Dependence on Persian Gulf Crude Oil (1979)
(Thousand Barrels Per Day)
Imports Dependence
Own Persian Imports Total on Persian
Country Production Gulf Other Crude Gulf
Japan 10 3,502 1,344 4,856 72.1
Canada 1,480 262 342 1,797 14.6
Germany 95 866 1,281 2,242 38.6
U.S. 10,200 3,100 5,600 18,500 17.0
Source: Quarterly il Statist ics , Fourth Quartier 1979, OEC
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U.S. dependence on uncertain foreign oil rose rapid-
ly from 3.4 mmb/d in 1970 to 8.5 mmb/d in 1979, or nearly
20half of U.S. petroleum consumption.
In 1979, the U.S. obtained 3.1 million barrels per
day from the Middle East, almost 35 percent of its total
oil imports of 8.5 mmb/d. In contrast Europe received 8
mmb/d from the Gulf, against a total import volume of 13
mmb/d. Japan, for all practical purposes, is 100 percent
dependent on imports for its daily oil consumption of 5.6
mmb/d, and in that year required 4 mmb/d from the Gulf.
In sum, the U.S. obtained 35 percent of its supply from
the volatile Gulf region, Europe 62 percent, and Japan 72
21percent. By 1980, the U.S. was even more dependent on
oil imports from countries in the vulnerable Persian Gulf
area than at the time of 1973 embargo (Refer to Figure 4).
In depending upon the Middle East, the strategic link is not
the physical availability of oil, but the political factors
22
that make the oil accessible. What makes the U.S. so
vulnerable is not that oil imports are projected to increase
over the next decade, but that a significant amount of
suppliers of this oil are from the politically unstable
Middle East
.
The primary focus of U.S. energy policy development,
beginning with Project Independence in 1973 through the
passage of the Energy Security Act of 1980, has been to
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Figure 4 U.S. Dependence on Petroleum Imports
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East. Despite these important efforts, energy analysts now
generally agree that, due to the lead times involved, the
nation will still remain dependent on substantial volumes
23
of oil imports for at least the next decade or two.
TABLE 14
U.S. Crude Oil and Petroleum Products: 1973-1983
Total Domestic Imports Percent Arab OPEC (%)
1973 17.3 10.9 6.3 36% .9 (5%)
1974 16.7 10.5 6.1 37% .8 (5%)
1975 16.3 10.1 6.1 37% 1.4 (9%)
















8.8 48% 3.2 (17%)
8.4 43% 3.0 (16%)
8.5 43% 3.1 (17%)
6.9 41% 2.6 (15%)
6.0 37% 1.8 (11%)
5.0 33% .8 (5%)
4.3 28%
Average: 10.2
Source: Monthly Energy Reports March 1983, Department of
Energy, pp. 38-39.
A very important trend (See Table 14) is to notice
the level of domestic production has averaged about 10.2
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ramb/d from 1973 to 1983. When domestic demand goes up, the
import level goes up; consequently, when the demand falls,
the import level falls. For example, in 1981 the U.S.
significantly reduced its dependence on petroleum imports by
reducing domestic consumption of petroleum. This decline in
domestic consumption occurred principally as a result of
lower economic activity in 1981 and the ongoing effects of
repeated sharp increases in petroleum product prices since
241973. (See Table 15) Since domestic production was stable
during 1981, the .9 million barrels per day drop in domestic
consumption resulted in a .9 million barrels per day drop
decrease in im.ports.
TABLE 15
Direct Relationship Between Imports and Demand
1980 1981 Change
Total Products 17.0 16.1 .9
Supplied
Total Petroleum 10.2 10.2
Production
Petroleum Imports 6.9 6.0 .9
Source: Monthly Energy Reports March 1983.
An important assumption based upon the trends of
Exhibit 1 is that one can expect that as the economic re-
covery progresses more oil will be demanded. As domestic
production has leveled off at 10.2 mmb/d, this increased
demand can only be met through higher imports. With the
Middle East oil having the largest non-communist reserves
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available, one can only expect that the Gulf states will
help met U.S. import demands.
OPEC producers saw demand for their product fall by
40 percent from 31 mmb/d in 1979 to less than 18 mmb/d in
25
early 1982. However, even with the last two years or so,
new supplies on energy will be required to satisfy the nations
future energy needs. Recent projections still indicate that
the U.S. will need from 13 to 21 percent more energy in 1990
26than it is using today. If presenx trends continue, this
increase in energy demand equates to the U.S. being a steady
consumer of Middle East oil for quite some time. Despite
reports of a glut of oil in the international petroleum
market, the margin between an adequate and inadequate supply
is so thin that a crisis in any of the major oil exporting
nations could produce a serious threat to global economic
and political security.
Presently the surplus margin production now exceeds
2,000,000 b/d. The potential for a similar incident to the
Iranian/Iraqi conflict is an example of a Middle East crisis
which could eliminate this 2,000,000 b/d surplus. The
Iranian/Iraqi conflict has already interrupted exports by
those two countries, as follows:
TABLE 16






A crisis like this could end the surplus oil very
quickly. Nearly one-third of the world's total supply of
oil moves through the Strait of Hormus at the mouth of the
Persian Gulf. Iran recently threatened it would mine the
Strait, and if such an operation were undertaken success-




The availability and the price of energy in the U.S.
respond primarily to the supply and price of oil. Currently
there are no domestic energy plans that will alleviate our
need to import oil from the Middle East . The best recent
estimates of qualified oil analysts are that demand for OPEC
28
oil in 1985 will be between 32.8 mmb/d and 48.7 mmb/d.
The U.S. requirements for Middle East oil will persist. The
possibilities of substituting other OPEC or non OPEC oil for
Middle East sources are limited.
To escape dependence on the Middle East, the U.S.
would need to find substitute sources for the 46 percent of
its projected import requirements, or around four mmb/d.
3. Military Vulnerability
The U.S. military is very vulnerable to oil disrup-
tions. The Department of Defense is the largest single user
of our nation's energy. The DOD accounts for approximately
1.7 percent of the total national consumption. During war-
time conditions, the DOD petroleum requirement is expected
to increase by a factor of three or more. However, during
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peacetime with normal requirements, the DOD experienced
difficulty procuring sufficient fuel for peacetime opera-
tions during both the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo and the
1979-1980 Iranian oil crisis.
Although the strategic components of naval fleets
(aircraft carriers, missile submarines) are being converted
to nuclear power, much of the rest of the strategic military
forces of the U.S. and its allies and all their tactical
forces are fueled by oil. By 1977, George Marienthal,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense stated that there was
a strong consensus among the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Military Departments that recent petroleum levels of the
operating forces have been at least marginally adequate to
.... , . 30
maintain force readiness.
In February 1978 Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
stated: "I cannot report that our forces are as ready as I
would like them to be... our necessary efforts to conserve
fuel have meant reductions in ground combat training exer-
cises. Navy steaming hours, and flying hours for all
„31services .
"
U.S. Department of Defense fuel cost will run some 7
billion dollars in 1980, double what they were a year pre-
viously. This constitutes a tangible and visible drain
on the resources available for our military security. In
1980 alone, fuel cost increases consumed enough capital to
32build another aircraft carrier. DOD analyst recently
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computed that each one cent per gallon rise in cost of fuel
33
adds $80 million daily to DOD's operating cost.
Aside from operating cost, the U.S. military is also
directly linked to oil vulnerability but from a slightly
different angle. During the 1973-74 embargo, NATO members
except Portugal and briefly Germany, refused the U.S. the
use of their territories to resupply Israel out of fear of
retaliatory cutoffs of oil supplies. A reliable supply of
oil is considered essential to the effectiveness of NATO
because the European members of NATO obtain most of their
oil from the Middle East.
Strategic stockpiling of oil was designed to diminish
U.S. vulnerability to the effects of an oil supply disrup-
tion. However, there is serious doubt that the SPR could
maintain the viability of the national economy in the ab-
sence of critical oil imports and simultaneously support
the needs of the DOD. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve is
not designed to meet military needs effectively. (A de-
tailed discussion of the DOD and the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve can be found in Chapter 6 Section 6.)
F. VULNERABILITY DEPENDENCE: SUBJECTIVE ANALYST
The previous section analyzed the objective vulnerabil-
ity dependence as a result of the policy changes that have
been implemented. This section will analyze the degree to
which various groups recognize the index of vulnerability
noted in the previous section.
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1. Energy Experts and Analyst
G. Henry M. Schuler, director of energy programs
at the Georgetown University Center of Strategic and
International Studies, believes that even though oil con-
sumption was down in 1982, there is little solace to be found
in oil figures showing that the United States imported
30 percent of its oil requirements in 1982. Schuler states,
"If our reliance upon oil imports— albeit a marginally reduced
reliance—still poses a threat to our national security, we
34
must develop a strategic response to that threat."
Ragaei El Mallakh, director of the University of
Colorado's International Research Center for Energy and
Economic Development warns that , "a third oil shock could
35happen much sooner than most people expect." Charles
Ebinger, associate director of energy programs at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies believes that with
global reserve /product ion ratios continuing to decline at a
rate of 3 to 3.5 billion barrels per year and exploration
and development deferred because of lower oil prices, "there
is an acute danger that 10 years from now, we could experience
36
serious petroleum shortfalls."
Oil experts believe that present policies have not
altered the situation enough to reduce economic vulnerability
to oil disruptions. The loss of a few million barrels per
day could raise the oil price by 10 dollars per barrel; the
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loss of the whole Persian Gulf could push the price of oil
37
over $100 per barrel.
In 1979 the U.S. spent $57.8 billion on oil imports.
In 1980, Americans reduced their oil consumption yet paid
38
more—almost $80 billion— for less foreign oil.
The U.S. and its allies are suffering the conse-
quences of a 1000 percent increase in oil prices during the
1970 's created by our excessive dependence on an OPEC
controller world oil market. The Department of Energy
estimates that the U.S. GNP loss from an interruption in
Persian Gulf oil supply would be a 75 percent reduction for
6 months and a 50 percent reduction for another 6 months
39
would reduce the GNP by about 940 billion dollars.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the loss of
Saudi oil for a year in 1984 would cost the U.S. 272 billion
^ n 40dollars.
Even though the U.S. belongs to the lEA which would
share their supplies, the U.S. would still be left with a
shortfall of 3.5 mmb/d, the unemployment rate increased by
2.1 percentage points, and the inflation rate increased by
4120 percentage points.
There is good reason to think that the vulnerability
of economies to future shocks has actually increased. The
share of GNP in Western economies devoted to energy expen-
ditures has tripled, from about 3 percent to 8 to 10
percent. Thus, an oil price rise of any given magnitude
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Impact of a Year Long Oil Supply Interruption
(Amounting to 3.5 Million Barrels Per Day)
1984 1987
Change in Real GNP -272 -100
(in billions of 1984 dollars)
Change in Real GNP (percent) -6.6 -2.2
Change in Unemployment 2.1 1.2
Rate (percentage points)
Change in Inflation 20.0 2.5
Rate (percentage points)
Source: The World Oil Market in the 1980 's ; Implications
for the U.S., p. 60.
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will now have a greater effect on the consuming nations than
the first or second shock did, i.e., sensitivity has
, 42increased.
The problem is that many people do not recognize or
ignore that sensitivity has increased which is an indicator
that vulnerability has increased. During a surplus condi-
tion (oil glut) it is a recurring temptation for the
United States to regard the oil acquisition process as being
met through reliable, secure, bountiful resources. As noted
previously in the Iranian/Iraqi example, Americans still
tend to ignore the point that these principal exporters are
as capable of creating a condition of surplus as they are of
precipitating a shortage. Yet when a surplus appears, it is
an American predilection to assume that sensitivity has
decreased so they can relax.
There is little doubt about the physical adequacy of
reserves for the next decade, at least. As has been demon-
strated, the energy experts and analyst assume that rather
than the physical availability of oil, it is the political
factor that that is the key question. This assumption assumes
that the Middle East oil sources will remain the key
44
suppliers of the international oil barrel. As noted in





The Department of Energy believes that b3^ 1990, the
best case projection is for dependence to decline to just
above 15 percent—still enough to be a major factor.
Additionally, the policies and programs that are in place
now or are being established under existing statutes are
not likely to free the U.S. from dependence on imported oil
until sometime in the 1990 's at the earliest. The Depart-
ment of Energy recommends that other measures and policies
should be adopted to lessen the vulnerability the U.S.
now faces. The DOE concludes its warning with this state-
ment, "the wisest policy course would seem to be to assume
that--unless added initiatives are undertaken—the United
States will continue to import oil at close to today's level
for the next 5 years, and that our situation will improve
45




The Senate Committee of Energy and Natural Resources
recently completed a study on the geopolitics of oil. In
its assessment of U.S. dependence on Persian Gulf oil, the
study states, "The United States and our allies are likely
to experience at least two more decades of vulnerability to
supply disruptions, political manipulation of oil supplies,
46
and periods of panic buying on the spot market."
Senator James McClure, Chairman of the committee on
Energy and Natural Resources, recently stated, "We are all
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too quick to forget how potentially unstable world petroleum
supplies are and how quickly consumers react when even
47threatened with a shortage." This chapter has demon-
strated that the reason many people fail to recognize the
degree of vulnerability is that they fail to understand or
ignore the difference between sensitivity and vulnerability.
The problem occurs during a surplus condition when people
fail to recognize that the U.S. has a high sensitivity to
oil disruptions. Sensitivity is a measure of vulnerability
and when sensitivity is high, there is a good possibility
that vulnerability is high. In sum, despite report of a
glut of oil in the international petroleum market, the
margin between adequate and inadequate supply is so thin
that a crisis in any one of the major oil exporting nations




II. U.S. RESPONSE TO 1973-74 AND 1978-79 OIL CRISES
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will first review the changes in U.S. oil
dependence from 1947-1973; 1973-1979; 1979-1983. This
section will be primarily historical, presenting the changes
in U.S. dependence and explaining the causes. The second
part of the chapter will review U.S. reactions and policies,
i.e., the pre-embargo period; Nixon response to 1973; post
embargo Ford and Carter policies; Carter and Reagan reac-
tions to 79 crisis.
B. OVERVIEW OF U.S. OIL USE, PRODUCTION AND POLICY ISSUES
Before the war, and up to 1945, the United States was
the leading exporter of petroleum products to Europe and
to other parts of the world, but it soon lost that position
as its relatively slowly growing oil production was required
at home to sustain the country's rapid economic development.
Its oil industry became a separate entity with such
differences in price levels and in organization from the
rest of the world as to necessitate an increasingly autarkic
policy on the part of the United States, whose oil industry
would have greatly diminished in size if it had been
subjected to competition from outside in the 1950 's and the
1960 's. This situation has changed since 1973 because of
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major increases in the price of international oil and
because of the inability of the United States oil industry
to produce enough oil to meet the country's growing demand
[Ref. 48].
Before the 1930 's holders of mineral rights were
permitted to take as much oil as they could be drilling on
their property, whether or not they drew oil from under
other properties. This led to competitive drilling, with
each party attempting to extract as much of the common oil
pool as possible irregardless if the oil pool extended
beyond the property boundaries. Not surprisingly, the
result was extremely rapid exploitation of oil fields.
During the 1930 's the solution in a number of oil
producing states was for the state governments to allocate
a share of the production to each of the landowners. The
rate of extraction was called the "maximum efficient rate
of production" or MER. Along with this, a statewide re-
striction on production was often imposed. These two mea-
sures were implemented in a number of states, including
major oil producers such as Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana,
and together they came to be called "market -demand
prorationing" [Ref. 49].
The Texas Railroad Commission, a state institution that
enforced market demand prorationing was very effective in
instituting very rigid production controls and preventing
wasteful uncontrolled pumping of oil. These controlling
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agencies were also able to raise prices of crude oil under
state direction. The domestic cartel price was substan-
tially above the price that would have existed in a
competitive market with unitized fields [Ref. 50].
In the 1950 's as demand for oil increased, United States
oil companies sought both oil and markets abroad to obtain
lower cost crude oil supplies than thej^ had available from
their fields in the United States as a result of the
prorat ioning. Their intention was to ship their cheap
foreign oil back to the United States so as to increase the
profitability of their domestic refining and marketing
operations by selling the imported oil for a higher price.
By 1955 overseas imports had increased four times, and
domestic producers were concerned that their domestic
production would have to be cut back to make room for the
indefinite expansion of overseas imports [Ref. 51].
For United States producers there was no remedy for the
situation in the private sector. The only recourse was
political in attempting to have the Federal Government solve
the situation. As the phenomenon of an increasing depen-
dence on oil imports coincided with the political diffi-
culties of the Cold War and a feeling in the United States
that much of the world was hostile to its power and in-
fluence, politicians quickly backed up the security-of-
supply argument in their pleading for restrictions in
imports of oil [Ref. 52].
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In 1954 and again in 1958 the Federal Government called
for voluntary restraint on the part of importing companies.
These were ineffective and in 1959 President Eisenhower
introduced mandatory quotas on both crude oil and oil
products and effectively close the United States market to
the unlimited entry of oil from the rest of the world except
Canada and iMexico. (Canada and Mexico were excluded from
the restrictions on the grounds that imports from these
countries were not at risk as they did not depend on ocean
transportation.) [Ref. 53]
The economic effects of this decision by the United
States government gave a high degree of protection to
domestic oil interest, whose output was maintained at a
level far higher than it would have been with continued
unrestricted foreign competition. The controls also
produced a situation in which United States oil and coal
reserves ran down faster than would have been the case if
unlimited foreign oil had been allowed into the country,
i.e., the U.S. managed to reduce sensitivity in the short
run but at a cost of greater vulnerability in the long run
as demonstrated by having a greater dependence on Middle
East oil when the 1978 crisis occurred [Ref. 54].
The oil that became available on the world market as a
result of import quotas in the United States dropped in
price. As prices in the market fell, OPEC in 1960 was
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organized to try to ensure that producing countries did not
lose further revenues.
With the 1973 oil crisis, foreign oil prices rose to the
point that the price of delivered foreign oil was comparable
to domestic crude. In these circumstances the quotas served
no function except to allocate the foreign crude among
importers. The quotas were not keeping oil out, nor were
they keeping domestic prices up. In April 1973, the
President announced the end of import quotas and substi-
tuted a system of license fees to encourage domestic
production and refining [Ref. 55].
With the 1973 oil crises and the resulting oil price
hikes, U.S. consumers still wanted cheap energy. The
Emergency Petroleum Act of 1973 was the beginning of a
combination of measures that effectively kept the price of
oil to U.S. consumers below the world level.
These energy measures have had the effect of taxing
domestic oil production in order to subsidize oil imports
[Ref. 56]. Under this policy the Federal Energy Administra-
tion set an average price that domestic producers would
receive $7.66 for a barrel of oil in 1976. In order to
refine this crude oil, the producer had to purchase a ticket
called an "entitlement" at a cost of approximately $2 a
barrel. This constituted a tax on domestic production.
Imports were subsidized by granting refiners who imported
oil at the (then) world price of about $12.5 a barrel an
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entitlement worth $3 a barrel. Whatever the source of the
imported oil the cost to refiners was the same $9.50 a
barrel, and the price of oil was substantially below the
world market price. Either way, the effective cost of oil
to refiners was about the same $9.50 a barrel (See Table
18).
TABLE 18
post-1973 Subsidizing of Oil Imports
Price Domestic Crude $7.66 $12.50 World Price of Crude
Tax to Refine U.S. +2.00 -3.00 Federal Subsidy
Crude
Total Cost to $9.66 $ 9.50 Total Cost to
Refiners Refiners
Source: Webb, Michael G. , and Ricketts, Martin J., The
Economics of Energy
,
p. 267, the Macmillan Press LTD, 1980.
As price controls on U.S. produced oil continued, the
lower prices resulted in the U.S. increasing the quantity
of its oil imports [Ref. 57]. With low prices shielding U.S.
consumers somewhat from the rise in international prices,
demand for oil continued to rise as there was little incen-
tive for conservation. With U.S. oil production peaking
in 1970, and oil producers not receiving higher prices to
justify expanded production, the effects of these measures
were that imports of crude oil rose from 4.7 mbd in 1972
to 8.6 mbd in 1977, the latter figure representing over
40 percent of consumption.
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The 1978 oil crises were followed by a doubling of oil
prices. Following the 1978 crises, oil prices were decon-
trolled and U.S. prices were allowed to rise to the world
oil price. The following section assesses the dependence
changes in oil imports.
C. REVIEW OF CHANGES IN U.S. DEPENDENCE
1. Introduction
This section will review that the United States
became a net importer of petroleum (crude and products) in
1947. Thereafter, total consumption in the United States
rose from approximately 6 million barrels per day in 1948 to
over 17.3 million just before the embargo in 1973. Pro-
duction of domestic crude oil and liquids rose from 5.9
million barrels per day in 1948 to 10.8 million in 1973,
but it had peaked in 1970 at 11.2 million. Imports repre-
sented over 36 percent of consumption by 1973; midway in that
year, direct imports of Arab oil were running one million
barrels per day (or 5 percent of the total oil consumed),
up from less than half that amount a year and a half earlier
[Ref. 58].
2. Review of Changes in U.S. Dependence; 1947-1973
Between 1850 and 1973, energy consumption increased
some thirty-five times over. Petroleum has not always played
a significant role in the U.S. energy picture. In 1850, wood
was the major source of energy in the U.S. supplying 91
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percent of the total consumed. This trend continued as
late as 1870 when America obtained three quarters of its
energy from wood. Coal by 1910 had replaced wood by
contributing 77 percent to the total energy.
The modern oil industry was born in the United States
in 1859. From the beginning, the United States supplied
not only its own needs but, as the leading exporter, those
of much of the rest of the world as well. As late as 1929,
a third of the total demand for oil outside the United States
was met by U.S. exports. Out of seven million barrels of
oil used by the Allies in World War II, six were provided by
the United States [Ref. 59]. In 1949, the National Petroleum
Council remarked that oil was a prime weapon of victory in
two world wars and it was the bulwork of our national
security [Ref. 60]. By 1950 petroleum had passed coal as the
main contributor of energy and by 1976 supplied 47.3 percent
of the total (See Table 19) [Ref. 61].
Total energy consumption more than doubled (see
Table 19) between 1950 and 1973. The shift away from coal
was substantial— from a third to a sixth of total energy
consumption. During this time, American society was
conditioned to the easy availability of energy, especially
oil. Between 1950 and 1973, the price of domestically
produced crude oil declined in real terms by 21 percent.
The composite price of all domestically produced fossil



















Imported Oil .6 4 6.1 17 917%
Coal 6.1 38 6.3 18 3%
Natural Gas 2.8 18 10.7 30 282%
Hydro .7 4 1.4 4 100%
Other** .4 1
122%
*mbdoe = millions of barrels daily of oil equivalent
** includes nuclear
Source: Energy Information Agency, Report to Congress , 1979
,
Vol. II, pp. 7, 13.
^Q

The reasons oil was being substituted for coal was
twofold: First, the easy availability of oil especially
cheap foreign oil; and second, influential environmental
organizations whose increased concern for the environment
caused legislation requiring the use of oil as a preferred
fuel over coal in many industries [Ref. 63]. Concern about
the environmental impact of burning coal led to fuel
switching to oil. This change led to a dramatic increase
in oil consumption by oil companies. For example, between
1968 and 1973, oil consumption by electric utilities more
than tripled, much of this being low sulfur imported oil
[Ref. 64].
The reason for the rapid growth in the demand for
oil in the United States through the nineteen-sixties were
many, but the most important was probably the fall in
domestic real prices for oil combined with a high rate of
growth in the economy. In January, 1969, the price of oil,
when compared with the price of other products at whole-
sale, was 10 percent lower than it had been eleven years
earlier. Energy was becoming cheaper relative to almost
everything else, and demand both in the United States and
in the world reacted accordingly.
In the United States consumption of oil and its pro-
ducts grew at an annual rate of over 4 percent during the
nineteen-sixties, rising to a 5.4 percent annual growth




U.S. Crude Oil Consumption and Imports: 1960-1973
Millions of Barrels Per Day
CoiQsumption Imports Percent of Imports
1960 9.8 1.8 18%
1961 9.8 1.9 ^ ^ • O /o
1962 10.4 2.1 20%
1963 10.7 2.1 19.6%
1964 11.1 2.2 19.8%
1965 11.5 2.5 21.7%
1966 12.1 2,6 21.4%
1967 12.6 2.5 19.8%
1968 13.4 2.8 20.8%
1969 14.1 3.2 22.6%
1970 14.7 3.4 23%
1971 15.2 3.9 26%
1972 16.4 4.8 29%
1973 17.3 6.3 36%
Source: U.S . Department of the Interior;
,
Bureau of Mines,
Minerals and Materials, February 1978, p. 19.
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sources failed to keep pace. One factor depressing the
long-run development of domestic crude-oil reserves was the
severe restriction on output that state prorationing con-
trols imposed during the fifties and early sixties. In
1963, for example, the large, efficient, low-cost fields in
Texas were cut back to under 30 percent of maximum efficient
rate, while the high-cost stripper wells were allowed to pro-
duce without restriction. The result was a dampening of
profit incentives for further exploration and development
[Ref. 65].
When demand presses upon capacity, as it did upon
domestic capacity after 1970, the price will rise and the
market will go in search of cheaper alternatives. As
matters worked out in the early nineteen-seventies , the
cheapest alternative was imported oil. Until 1973, quan-
titative restrictions on imports prevented the wholesale
substitution of foreign for domestic production, but when
increasing demand for lagging domestic supply began to push
prices up, the import restrictions gave way. Meanwhile,
the alternative domestic energy sources, instead of ab-
sorbing part of the incremental demand as oil prices
rose, actually contributed elements of their own to the
growing energy shortage [Ref. 66],
The turning point came in 1970, when U.S. oil
production reached its peak and then began to decline. By
1972 spare production capacity was exhausted. Consequently,
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the U.S. would have to seek foreign oil to meet any addi-
tional oil requirements as well as enough to make up for
falling domestic production.
In 1970, the year of greatest domestic petroleum
production, when 4.12 billion barrels were supplied by
producers in the U.S., only 1.16 billion barrels, or 22
percent of the total consumed, came from foreign sources.
By 1974 domestic production was down to only 3.85 billion
barrels, and imports were 2.19 billion barrels, or 36
percent of total consumption [Ref. 67].
Consumption rose in 1971-73 at 4 percent per year
and nobody noticed that domestic oil was harder to find.
In order to make up for this growing gap between supply and
demand, we turned to importing more oil [Ref. 68]. U.S.
imports of crude oil rose by 145 percent from 1970 to 1973
and 46 percent between 1972 and 1973 [Ref. 69]. During this
same time period, 1971 to 1973, net oil imports into OECB
countries rose by 22 percent, straining world oil produc-
tion capacity [Ref. 70].
Beginning in 1970 world demand for oil was rising
at an astronomic rate and the U.S. was one of the biggest
demanders. The U.S. oil companies were unable to discover
new reserves fast enough to keep pace with the demands.
3. 1973 Embargo; Changes in U.S. Dependence
When the 1973 Arab oil embargo struck, the U.S.




U.S. Domestic Oil Production Trend
1960 7.9 mmb/d 1969 10.8 mmb/d
1961 8.2 1970 11.3
1962 8.4 1971 11.2
1963 8.6 1972 11.2
1964 8.8 1973 10.9
1965 9.0 1974 10.5
1966 9.6 1975 10.4
1967 10.2 1976 9.8
1968 10.6 1977 9.7
Source: U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Mines
,
















































































U.S. Oil Imports: 1970-73
Million of Barrels Per Day-
Rise: 1973
over 1968
1971 1972 1973 (percent)
United States 3,930 4,740 6,205 17.2%




By 1973 we were importing close to 39 percent of our oil
(around 6.8 mmb/d with consumption about 17.3 mmb/d). Of
the 39 percent imported oil, OPEC oil was accounting for
44 percent (3.0 mmb/d). The remaining 3.3 mmb/d or 56
percent was non OPEC.
On October 16, 1973, a world that was consuming
oil with abandon got a sudden shock. OPEC announced that
it was doubling the price. The jump in price was unex-
pected. Arab governments reduced oil production by 10
percent near the end of October 1973 and embargoed the
shipment of their oil to the U.S. Resentful of U.S.
resupply of Israel during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli
war, Arab producers cut production 25 percent. The OPEC
embargo directly jeopardized 28 percent of U.S. imports of
crude oil [Ref. 71].
During the embargo of 1973-74, consumers paid on
the open market as much as 17-18 dollars per barrel compared
with 3 dollars a barrel before the embargo. The embargo was
undoubtedly effective in keeping both crude oil of Arab
origin and the bulk of petroleum products refined from
Arab crude in Europe or the West Indies from reaching the
U.S. market during the embargo period.
The 1973 embargo caused U.S. oil imports to fall
only from 6.8 million barrels per day in November 1973 to
5.3 million in January 1974. Thereafter, imports continued




Monthly U.S. Oil Imports
During the Arab Embargo, 1973-74
1973 1974















1 ^_^ — ..^
1 17 5
1 2
Qatar 18 9 2
Saudi Arabia 788 635 196 21 39 86
United Arab Emirates 62 107 10
Total, Arab Countries 1336 1035 228 32 59 103
Total, Non-Arab 5189 5826 5718 5323 5162 5112
Countries
Total, All Countries 6525 6864 5945 5335 5221 5215
Source: U.S. Bureau of Mines, pp. 33-95.
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Since the 1973 oil embargo, the U.S. has dramatically
increased its oil imports. Net refined and crude imports
rose from about 6.3 mmb/d in 1973—representing 36 percent of
U.S. oil consumption—to about 8.5 mmb/d in 1979—approximate-
ly 43 percent of U.S. oil consumption [Ref. 72]. The coun-
tries responsible for the 1973 oil supply interruption now
provided a much larger share of U.S. petroleum imports. In
1973 AOPEC provided 5 percent of U.S. domestic demand (.9
mmb/d). By 1979 AOPEC provided 17 percent or 3.1 mmb/d of
U.S. import needs.
After the initial shock of the 1973-74 embargo wore
off, concern shifted to the other component of energy
security: af fordability . Noting the prices that people
were prepared to pay to get oil, the Shah of Iran convinced
most of the OPEC nations that it would be safe to double
the price again; they did so on 1 January 1974 [Ref. 73].
This led to panic buying mainly by the U.S. that
followed the Arab boycott led to further doubling of the
price. The era of cheap oil was over, and as from January
1, 1974, oil was costing its consumers four times more than
it had in the previous September. By 1978 its share had
risen to 39 percent, or 17 percent of U.S. domestic demand.
By 1979 the U.S. was importing over 40 percent of its
petroleum. The proportion of oil imports climbed as high as
48 percent in 1977. Since then Alaskan oil, high prices.
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conservation and foreign revolutions have reduced the
proportion to 43 percent.
TABLE 24
U.S. Imports from 1973 to 1979
Tot;al Imports Percent
1973 17.3 mmb/d 6 . 4 mmb /
d
36%
1974 16.7 6.1 37%
1975 16.3 6.0 37%
1976 17.5 7.3 42%
1977 18,4 8.8 48%
1978 18.8 8.1 43%
1979 19.0 8.1 43%
Source: Monthly Enlergy Review, Department of Ener gy , 1979.
In 1979 the U.S. sustained the high import rate be-
cause importing was the most economical way to fill the gap
between domestic production and demand [Ref. 74]. Before
the events in Iran, the U.S. was the second largest market,
behind Japan, for Iranian oil. In 1978, U.S. imports of
Iranian crude oil accounted for 9 percent of U.S. oil
consumption [Ref. 75].
Through 1978, Iran accounted for approximately 10
percent of the world's oil production, with output of 5
million to 6 million barrels per day. The overthrow of the
Shah in early 1979 led to a 10 week period in which Iran
produced almost no oil. With the fall of the Shah in Iran,
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oil prices increased two and one half times its former level.
The Iranian crisis led to world oil prices being raised a
staggering 120 percent in 1979, from an average of 13
dollars per barrel at the beginning of January to 28 dollars
by the end of December [Ref. 76].
Still, in 1981 foreign oil accounted for 36 percent
of all the oil Americans used and 31.6% as of mid-1982. And
despite the decreased volume of imports, the 1981 oil import
bill was $76.7 billion—only a little less than 1980 's $80
billion [Ref. 77].
Petroleum was the principle U.S. energy import in
1982. During 1982, petroleum (crude oil and refined petroleum
products) accounted for 88.7 percent of total energy imports.
In 1982, the United States imported more crude oil but
less refined petroleum than in 1973. Imports of crude oil
grew 6.7 percent while imports of refined petroleum fell
50.3 percent over the 9-year period [Ref. 78].
The large drop in net imports of energy into the
United States in 1982 was the fifth consecutive annual
decrease. The peak year for net imports of energy was 1977.
The 1982 net imports level is only 41 percent of the 1977
record level and just 58 percent of the 1973 net imports
total. Net imports of energy into the U.S. accounted for
10.4 percent of the Nation's total energy consumption in













Total Imports Percent OPEC (%) OPEC (%)
17.3 6.3 36% 3.0 (17%) .9 (5%)
16.7 6.1 37% 3.3 (19%) .8 (5%)
16.3 6.1 37% 3.6 (22%) 1.4 (9%)
17.5 7.3 42% 5.1 (29%) 2.4 (14%)
18.4 8.8 48% 6.2 (33%) 3.2 (17%)
18.4 8.4 43% 5.8 (32%) 3.0 (16%)
18.5 8.5 43% 5.6 (30%) 3.1 (17%)
17.0 6.9 41% 4.3 (25%) 2.6 (15%)
16.1 6.0 37% 3.3 (20%) 1.8 (11%)








percent, and significantly lov/er than the 1977 net imports
portion of 23.6 percent [Ref. 79].
In sum, the U.S. increased its oil imports consider-
ably after the 1973 oil crisis. After the 1978 oil crisis,
oil imports have begun to decline to the point where Arab
OPEC levels are the same now as they were in 1973 (see
Table 25). The important point is that the U.S. is just as
dependent on oil imports from countries in the vulnerable
Persian Gulf area as it was during the time of the 1973
embargo [Ref. 80].
D. U.S. REACTIONS AND POLICIES
The 1973 Arab oil embargo and the 1978 Iranian crisis
caught the United States by surprise. In both cases, the
United States was ill-prepared to cope with the sudden
decrease of available foreign oil and the ensuing rise
in crude oil price.
The most salient reason that the 1973 oil embargo caught
the U.S. by surprise was that no one fully anticipated the
emerging dependence and vulnerability associated with the
Middle East. Consequently, there were no policies to cope
with an interruption of a significant amount of imports of
crude oil and products into the United States. Although the
possibility of a disruption of Arab oil supplies had been
aired for some time in public and intergovernmental dis-
cussions, neither government nor industry took steps to
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provide for increased imports from alternative sources in
such an emergency [Ref. 81].
The focus of our leaders in the 1960 's and early 1970 's
was primarily on the Soviet threat, Vietnam, civil rights,
Watergate, and space exploration. No one thought an oil
cartel composed of unstable Gulf States could cooperate on
anything especially manipulating oil exports.
1. Pre-1973 Embargo Responses
A brief description of the U.S. response to the
energy situation before the 1973 oil embargo is necessary
in order to adequately understand the entire scope of U.S.
dependence on oil. In less than 50 years the U.S. had gone
from energy self-sufficiency to a significant dependency
on imported energy. In March 1959 the federal government
instituted the mandatory oil import program, imposing a
quota based upon a percentage of domestic production which
lasted until 1970. The oil import program of the U.S.
limited petroleum imports (with the exception of imports of
residual fuel oil) to 12 percent of domestic production.
Thus the U.S. drew on world markets for only a fraction of
its additional oil demand [Ref. 82]. The effect of the
quota was to promote the development of domestic production
capacity and to maintain domestic crude prices about 60
percent higher than foreign prices. One result of the quota
was that U.S. dependence on foreign imports stayed at less
than 25 percent of domestic oil consumption [Ref. 83].
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However, the oil import quota created a recurring
windfall gain for U.S. refiners by giving them the rights to
the restricted (but cheaper) oil imports in proportion to
their shares of domestic refinery "throughput." The quota
had a number of unintended and apparently ill side effects,
i.e., a shortage of domestic refining capacity in the early
1970 's (because of uncertainty about access to crude oil
within the U.S.), and a sharp increase in oil imports just
before the Arab embargo of 1973 (through the rapid
relaxation of the quota in an attempt to stem crude oil
price increases) [Ref. 84].
After 1970 the government relaxed oil import quotas
in the U.S. to meet the projected gap between domestic de-
mand and domestic production at prevailing energy prices.
As a result of the more liberal quota policy and domestic
price controls which tended to discourage domestic production,
net petroleum imports in the U.S. increased from 21 percent
of total consumption in 1969 to 28 percent in 1972. In
April 1973 President Nixon removed the mandatory quotas
entirely and replaced them with a less restrictive system of
license fees or tariffs which further encouraged oil imports
[Ref. 85]. By 1973, the year of the oil embargo, the oil
import figure had risen to 36 percent [Ref. 86].
Oil was the only commodity in the entire economy that
was never freed from President Nixon's temporary wage and
price controls imposed in 1971. This created an inevitable
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gap between supply and demand for domestically produced oil.
We bridged it by importing more oil, leaving us vulnerable
[Ref. 87].
Nixon was concerned with becoming too dependent on
foreign sources of oil. However, in 1971 Nixon imposed an
across the board temporary wage and price freeze. These
controls did not allow oil prices to rise. Production from
oil wells was leveling off and the development of new
sources was proving expensive. The artificially low price
of domestic oil discouraged new expensive exploration. But
it also allowed consumers to go on guzzling oil as if
nothing had happened.
2 . Responses to 1973 Embargo
U.S. foreign policy during the embargo was directed
toward persuading the Arabs that their boycott of the U.S.
was unwarranted [Ref. 88]. Three weeks after the 1973
embargo Nixon announced the goal of energy independence by
1980: "Let us set as our national goal, in the spirit of
Apollo, with the determination of the Manhattan project,
that by the end of this decade we will have developed the
potential to meet our own energy needs without dependence
on any foreign energy sources" [Ref. 89], Unfortunately for
Nixon and Congress, the oil dependence and vulnerability




The U.S. government was not aware of its degree of
dependency on imported oil. Congress declared, "Only since
November 1973 has the nation discovered the full dimensions
of U.S. increasing dependence on oil from the Arab states.
Thought to be five to six percent dependent on Arab oil, it
was determined the U.S. was 14 to 18 percent dependent
[Ref. 90]. After 1973 the easy assumptions about limitless
cheap energy to fuel economic growth were suddenly dispelled
According to the U.S. Congress in December 1973, "The
burgeoning U.S. energy crisis has dealt our nation the most
serious threat to its national security since World War II"
[Ref. 91].
The U.S. was ill-prepared for the 1973 Arab oil
embargo. When it came, the U.S. encouraged oil companies
to spread the burden equally among all consuming countries
[Ref. 92]. In response to the Arab oil embargo, the U.S.
proposed an International Energy Program (lEP) to coordinate
the energy policies of the industrial oil importing states.
The U.S. argued that the lEP establish a 7 dollar floor
price so that cheaper oil would not destroy incentives for
investing in long term energy alternatives.
The U.S. strategy following the Arab oil embargo of
October 1973 was to maintain control on the wellhead price
of domestic oil and prohibit exports of Alaskan oil. It is
very important to note that the price controls on domestic
crude oil implemented as part of the general price controls
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of 1971-1974 took on a life of their own. The purpose of
tying the controlled price of oil to 1972 production levels
reflected the motive of preventing U.S. crude oil producers
from reaping windfall profits on the sharp increase in world
oil prices in 1973-74. The government was very concerned
that U.S. oil producers would try to take advantage of the
sudden fourfold increase in crude oil prices and thus try to
increase domestic production. An important side effect of
the controls, which restricted domestic U.S. crude oil
production, was to increase the demand for crude oil
imports [Ref. 93].
The general consensus in Congress during the embargo
was that the inflated oil prices would drop considerably
once events that had precipitated the embargo had been
normalized. Many believed the inflated prices would create
a glut in the market and dissolve OPEC. However, the full
impact of the embargo was not to be realized until a much
later date. This lack of foresight was the reason Congress
did not use the Naval Petroleum Reserves to ease the
decreased oil imports during the embargo. The following
sections will assess each administration's response to the
1973 and/or 1978 oil crisis.
a. Nixon Response
Responding to the oil embargo. President Nixon
stated in an address to the American people on November 7,
1973, that the national goal by the end of the decade should
85 :

be to meet U.S. energy needs without any dependency on
foreign oil [Ref. 94]. Nixon stated, "Let us set as our
national goal, in the spirit of Apollo, with the determina-
tion of the Manhattan Project, that by the end of this
decade we will have developed the potential to meet our own
energy needs without dependence on any foreign energy
sources." But Watergate, not energy, was on the mind of
the President so the desire and ability to do much about
energy were sharply limited [Ref. 95].
President Nixon had recently imposed price and
wage controls on the economy in an effort to slow the
inflation. When the 1973 embargo occurred, the oil-pro-
ducing countries in a span of six months raised the price
for imported crude oil by over 300 percent. The increased
import prices created problems in the United States signi-
ficantly different from those of its trading partners in
Europe and Japan. First, the U.S. still produced over half
the petroleum it consumed. It was considered unfair that
these American producers should benefit by receiving the
artificially high prices charged by the OPEC countries.
Second, although the United States' domestic oil market had
(and still has) a multitude of competing firms—major oil
companies, independent oil companies, and small oil com-
panies—the major oil companies had the main access to
the cheap foreign oil; giving them, it was thought, an
S6

undeserved competitive advantage. Third, consumers had come
to treat inexpensive energy as a necessity [Ref. 96].
The U.S. government reacted by controlling oil
prices, as embodied in the Emergency Petroleum Allocation
Act (EPAA) of 1973. As price controls on U.S. produced
oil continued, the lower prices brought the logical result:
the U.S. increased the quantity of its oil imports. The
low prices shielded consumers somewhat from the rise in
international prices, and thus did little "CO encourage
conservation; they did even less to encourage domestic
production. Legislation was passed that attempted to in-
crease conventional domestic oil production by offering
incentives such as higher prices for certain categories of
oil with, presumably, higher potential production. For
example, new oil discovered after 1973 was priced higher
than old oil discovered before 1973 [Ref. 97].
Ironically, an administration strongly committed
to the free market ended up regulating and rigidifying the
petroleum market with price controls, with an allocation
system that encourage oil imports and inefficient refiners
[Ref. 98].
b. Ford's Response
The Ford Administration was devoted to trying
unravel the controls and regulations that had been imposed
by the Nixon administration [Ref. 99]. But in response to
Watergate, voters had sent a heavily Democratic Congress
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back to Washington in the 1974 elections. Some of the new
members, highly critical of "big oil," wanted to roll back
oil prices. With inflation still a primary concern, price
decontrol was not exactly a popular issue [Ref. 100].
By the time President Ford released the Project
Independence report in November 1974, U.S. energy policy-
makers were aware that under no political circumstances
could the United States become totally self-sufficient in
energy at reasonable economic costs. President Ford's motto,
"reasonable self-sufficiency," was heard more and more.
Although the Project Independence report reflected this new
mood in concluding that it would be difficult for the U.S.
to reduce its dependence on imported petroleum substantially
before 1980, the report's energy supply projections were
wildly optimistic [Ref. 101].
President Ford advocated bold initiatives, de-
signed for the most part to encourage development of domes-
tic energy supplies: creation of a 300 million barrel
strategic petroleum reserve (SPR), a tariff on imported crude
oil, attempts to decontrol domestic oil and natural gas
prices, the authority to order major power plants to convert
from oil and gas to coal [Ref. 102]. Additionally, Congress
approved the Alaskan pipeline. This made possible the single
most important contribution to American energy supply in the
1970 's. The Alaskan pipeline project when completed would
contribute 1.5 million barrels a day [Ref. 103].
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In 1975, Congress set fuel efficiency standards
for the automobile industry. By 1985, averages would have
to double to 27.5 miles per gallon. Since one out of every
nine barrels of oil used in the world every day was burned
as gasoline on American highways, such a change would have
a major impact not only on America's oil balance [Ref. 104].
President Ford proclaimed the Project Indepen-
dence theme with what might be called a "high production"
strategy. In January 1975, he called for a ten year program
to build 200 nuclear power plants, 250 major coal mines,
150 major coal-fire power plants, 30 major oil refineries,
and 20 major synthetic fuel plants [Ref. 105].
This strategy proved unrealistic for a variety
of reasons. One of the most important was that the environ-
mental movement had been gaining momentum since the late
1960 's. The strongest impact had initially been on the
strip mining and burning of coal, but in the mid-1970 's it
was even more so on nuclear power. By 1974, a national move-
ment opposing atomic energy had taken clear shape. Environ-
mentalism was not by any means solely responsible for the
difficulties encountered by nuclear power; rather, it
interacted with the economics—continually rising costs,
inflation, and, later high interest rates—to place major





The main objective of the Carter National
Energy Plan was to reduce imports of crude oil and oil
products and to limit the effect of interruptions to supply.
In April 1977 Carter introduced his plan which placed
greater emphasis on coal use (to be doubled by 1985) and
on conservation. Carter said, "our goal is to reduce our
growing dependence on foreign supplies of oil" [Ref. 107].
The first step Carter took was the creation of a single U.S.
Department of Energy. This was followed by the first
National Energy Plan with the goal of reducing reliance on
oil imports from projected levels of 16 mmb/d in 1985 to 6
mmb/d. In addition, the Strategic Petroleum Reserve was
to be expanded to 1 billion barrels [Ref. 108].
The president postulated ten fundamental prin-
ciples as the underlying rationale for the plan and the
framework within which present future policies should be
formulated. In summary, the ten principles are: 1. The
energy problem can be effectively addressed only by a
government that accepts responsibility for dealing with it
comprehensively and by a public that understands its serious-
ness and is ready to make necessary sacrifices. 2. Healthy
economic growth must continue, 3. National policies for
the protection of the environment must be maintained.
4. The U.S. must reduce its vulnerability to potentially
devastating supply interruptions. 5. The program must be
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fair. The United States must solve its energy problems in a
manner that is equitable to all regions, sectors, and
income groups. 6. The growth of energy demand must be
restrained through conservation and improved energy effi-
ciency. 7. Energy prices should generally reflect the true
replacement cost of energy. 8. Both energy producers and
energy consumers are entitled to reasonable certainty
about government policy. 9. Resources in plentiful supply
must be used more widely and the nation must begin the
process of moderating its use of those in short supply.
10. The use of nonconventional sources of energy—such as
solar, wind, biomass, geothermal—must be vigorously
expanded [Ref. 109].
The U.S. Congress, which feared incurring the
wrath of its constituents if it supported higher energy
prices, did not share the president's sense of urgency about
the energy crisis. Most members of Congress, like most
citizens, believed either that the energy crisis would pass
with time or that the crisis had been manufactured by the
energy industry to bolster its prices and profits. While
Congress, the administration, the media, and the energy
industry traded charges and countercharges about who was
to blame for the energy crisis, little progress was made
formulating a national energy program [Ref. 110].
The first Carter program was thoroughly worked
over by Congress. The problem that President Carter's
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National Energy Plan encountered in Congress was, that
although legislators agreed that higher domestic oil and
natural gas prices were needed to encourage conservation,
they could not agree on how high oil prices should get or
who should benefit from the increases [Ref. 111].
The Energy Bill, which was approved by the 95th
Congress in early October 1978, differed substantially from
Carter's first energy plan. Although Congress largely
agreed with the objectives of the Energy Plan, it refused
to endorse many of President Carter's proposed measures to
achieve them. A notable omission from the approved bill
was the proposed tax on crude oil. Even though the energy
plan's proposals would not have resulted in the domestic
price of crude oil being equal to the price of imports, the
gap between these two prices would have been substantially
reduced [Ref. 112].
The December 1978 passage of the National Energy
Act was heralded as a major step toward reducing U.S.
dependence on imported oil. In reality most of the provi-
sions had only a marginal impact on the way Americans pro-
duced and consumed energy, while others, particularly the
Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act (PIFU) , actually
served to increase oil imports by limiting the use of
natural gas by electric utilities [Ref. 113].
Although oil imports fell from 8.8 mmb/d in
1977 to 8.2 mmb/d in 1978, the U.S. energy situation had
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improved very little since 1973. Much of the decline had
occurred because of rising domestic Alaskan oil production,
a drawdown in oil stocks that had been built up to his-
torically high levels in the fourth quarter of 1977 when a
national coal strike had been feared, enhanced conserva-
tion in response both to rising OPEC prices, and fear that
the 1976-1977 gas shortage would be repeated. By the time
of the Iranian crisis of 1978, the U.S. oil import bill
hovered around $3 billion per month [Ref. 114].
d. Iranian Crisis: The Domestic Policy Response
Gas lines from April through June 1979 created
national hysteria. President Carter admonished the nation
in April 1979 that the nation's energy problem was serious
and getting worse. "Our national strength is dangerously
dependent on a thin line of oil tankers stretching halfway
around the earth to the Persian Gulf," warned Carter. "We
must produce more. We must conserve more."
In July 1979, the President offered a second
energy program, built around an $88 billion synthetic
fuels effort
—
primarily liquids from shale and liquids
and gas from coal. Unfortunately Carter's effort to reduce
U.S. vulnerability from another oil disruption was ineffec-
tual as demonstrated by the 1978 oil crises. Once again,
the U.S. was unprepared for a sudden decrease in foreign
oil. The continued regulation of oil prices was one of the
93

major reasons why the U.S. found itself to be even more
dependent on foreign oil in 1978 than in 1973.
The U.S. response to the 1978 oil disruption was
typical of the lack of preparedness and action demonstrated
in the 1973 oil crisis. The U.S. dispatched several high
level emissaries to Saudi Arabia to encourage them to raise
production. However, Saudi officials continued to state
that only the enactment of a comprehensive U.S. energy
policy designed to limit oil-import dependence could funda-
mentally alter the pressures on world oil supply and demand
[Ref. 115].
In April 1979 the U.S. began the gradual decon-
trol of domestic oil prices that will end the subsidization
of imports. At this time, the Department of Energy issued
a response describing the steps being taken to mitigate the
oil shortages: 1. Increased production at Elk Hills Naval
Petroleum Reserve 2. Reduction in the federal use of oil
3. Gradual decontrol of domestic crude oil prices 4. A
second energy program built around 88 billion dollar
synthetic fuels effort.
e. Reagan's Response
The Reagan administration has responded to the
oil problems of the 70 ' s by relying on free market forces
to solve the energy problems. The election of Ronald Reagan
clearly indicated that there was not yet a consensus on the
energy problem in the United States. As to the role of the
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government, the Reagan administration set its agenda in
conscious opposition to that of the Carter administration.
For the Reagan administration, the government was seen as
the real source of the energy problem. In 1978, at the time
of congressional action on Carter's First National Energy
Plan, Michael Halbouty, subsequently head of the Reagan
administration's energy task force in 1980, declared, "There
is no question that the public is confused about the energy
situation. I would like to clarify a flagrant misconception
by making it perfectly clear that there is no energy crisis
in the United States. This country has a tremendous amount
of energy potential. But there is a very very serious
energy problem— in fact, the problem is a crisis—namely,
Washington has politically manipulated, interfered, and
imposed dictatorial controls and regulations which severely
stymied discretionary productive efforts by the energy
industries" [Ref. 116].
In place of a policy concentrating on reducing
demand by a vast program of energy conservation measures
and the implementation of alternative energy strategies, the
present policy is based on complete confidence in the market
"if we had applied a free market policy on energy questions
from the beginning," according to one of the new men on
the Reagan White House Staff, "I think we would not have an
energy problem today" [Ref. 117].
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f. A Free Market Policy
The free market approach consists of encouraging
private sector preparation for the possibility of disrup-
tions by establishing a policy of not interfering in the
free market pricing and allocation of oil in the event of
a disruption. The risk of temporarily higher oil prices
sometime in the future would induce oil consumers to hedge
by stockpiling oil, signing long-term purchase agreements
with domestic suppliers, and undertaking oil conservation
measures [Ref. 118].
The emphasis on the free market approach has led
the Reagan administration to request the dismantling of the
regulatory system that has held up the development of
domestic production and also the Department of Energy
created by President Carter in 1976. The basic objective
is to stimulate domestic energy production under the effect
of the rise in world prices. The only major exceptions to
this rule are the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which is
regarded in a national security perspective as a defense
against oil import interruptions [Ref. 119].
The Reagan administration, confident in its
new free market philosophy appears to be bringing a clear
separation between energy policy and security matters.
Energy questions, which were a central concern of the
Carter administration, have seemingly been reduced to their
purely economic and national dimension, and left to private
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industry [Ref. 120], Consequently the administration has
virtually eliminated conservation and solar budgets, and
greatly reduced support for synthetic fuels development.
Reagan laid aside the post 1985 fuel efficiency standards
for the auto industry. Contingency planning for energy
emergencies has been downgraded.
One of the most controversial issues of domestic
energy policy is whether the decontrol of oil will raise
production enough to offset the declining reserve base of
oil. The United States is unlikely to produce more oil in
1985 or 1990 than it does today given the fact that consump-
tion continues to outpace production [Ref. 121].
E. CRITICAL LESSONS LEARNED FROM 1973 and 1978
The 1973 oil crisis demonstrated that the U.S. was vulner-
able to oil supply disruptions from the Middle East in
which it was strongly dependent upon. The U.S. did not
learn its lesson from this experience because by the time of
the second oil crisis in 1978 it was even more dependent on
Middle East oil. Also, the U.S. was more vulnerable in the
1978 crisis because it had failed to institute policies to
find viable substitutes to oil or increase domestic produc-
tion which had peaked in 1970. During this period, the
government kept oil prices artificially low to world oil




The American people assumed that the federal government
would evolve a policy to protect Americans from future
supply disruptions. However as noted, the government's
response to the 1973 oil crisis was very similar to the
people's. The government instead of planning for a future
oil interruption was more concerned with the windfall
profits of oil companies. As a result, the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve just before the Iranian revolution con-
tained only 92 million barrels—about 12 days of imports
[Ref. 122].
The 1973 Arab oil embargo seemed to have taught the U.S.
nothing when the Iranian revolution curtailed production in
1979. The filling of the Strategic Reserve that was to
alleviate oil shortages during a future oil crisis was
delayed and domestic price controls continued to encourage
oil imports to rise to a peak of 47 percent of oil con-
sumption by 1977. Yergin argues that the second oil shock
in absolute terms was more significant [Ref. 123].
Decontrolling in itself will not decrease our vulner-
ability. The U.S. presently imports over 30 percent of
our oil which is close to 1973 oil dependence. However, the
less dependence trend has created a false optimism that our
problems are solved as can be exemplified in William
Turcker's The Energy Crisis is Over . "On January 28, 1981,
after less than a week in office. President Reagan announced
that he was bringing an immediate end to the price controls
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that had governed American oil for almost ten years. With
that simple act, the energy crisis of the 1970 's ended"
[Ref. 124].
However, even with decontrol, oil industry officials
project declines in domestic oil production levels during
the 1980 • s , and the U.S. will be hard pressed to meet its
goal of halving imports by 1990 [Ref. 125],
The U.S. never learns from its previous mistakes when a
surplus appears. Americans assume that it is a permanent
condition and they tend to relax and not worry about the
future. Even following the 1978-79 crises, there is an
unwillingness of American citizens to believe that an energy
crisis does exist.
President elect Reagan in 1980 is quoted as predicting
that with decontrol, we could be producing enough oil to be
self-sufficient in five years [Ref. 126]. It is quite
apparent that President Reagan believes that the U.S. has
an abundance of domestic oil reserves. Presently, the U.S.
lacks an effective energy contingency planning for a major
national emergency. Just as the 1973-74 oil embargo and
1978-79 oil crisis were unexpected, any significant future
world oil supply interruption is apt to have aspects that
have not been anticipated.
At the beginning of the century, a system of four naval
petroleum reserves was established. The largest known
reserve is Elk Hills in California. During the Arab oil
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embargo, Congress debated but was unable to authorize a
single barrel of oil production from Elk Hills to alleviate
the harsh economic effects of the embargo. However, at a
later date, Congress authorized and appropriated funds for
full development of the Naval Petroleum Reserves. By
1976, these reserves were placed on full production, with
the petroleum being sold to offset development cost.
The attitude that seemed to prevail following the 1973
oil crisis was that it was a phony oil crisis. As a result
the U.S. pressed Saudi Arabia to moderate prices by holding
auctions and increasing its productive capacity toward 20
million barrels per day, even though this would make us more
dependent on the Persian Gulf [Ref . 127] . In addition to the
phony oil crisis attitude, a false optimism developed because
energy consumption was growing at a much slower pace than a
few years ago; new sources of crude oil in the North Sea,
Alaska, and Mexico, had temporarily eased the pressure of
the world's reliance on OPEC oil. People believed this
trend to mean that energy conservation was working. This
false hope perceived a new energy crisis occurring in the
next decade as declining.
The U.S. expected the enormous post embargo price
increases to stimulate exploration for new energy supplies,
restrain demand, and eventually reduce the real price of
imports. The problem was the reserve base for oil could not
sustain the kind of growth that it had in the past. From
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February 1976, our imports climbed from 33 percent to almost
50 percent by mid 1979.
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III. OIL GLUT AND U.S. VULNERABILITY
A. INTRODUCTION
The present drop in total oil demand and a much greater
reduction in demand for OPEC oil has resulted in a situation
which is being called the oil glut. This chapter will focus
on the oil glut and how it has affected U.S. sensitivity and
vulnerability dependence.
B. PRESENT SITUATION
After three straight years of declining free-world demand
for oil and with a fourth decline possible in 1983, the 13
member Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
is splintered by dissension. The present situation is one
of oil surplus and is commonly known as an oil glut.
The characteristics of the world energy scene have
changed radically in a very short period of time. In
1979/80 the major features of the oil situation were a
concern about security of supplies and a rapid escalation of
petroleum prices. However, quite different features
dominate today's situation. First, there is a marked de-
cline in world oil demand and a much greater reduction in
demand for OPEC oil. Secondly, the concern about prices no
longer relates to their high level or to prospects of future
rises, but to distortions in the price structure continually
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aggravated by competitive undercutting by some producing
countries [Ref. 128]. Unless economic recovery brings a
surge of new demand later this year, some analysts predict,
oil prices could plunge by as much as 10 dollars a barrel
to 24 dollars in the face of a market glut. Prices already
have fallen an average $3.47 a barrel during 1982 because
of the sluggish economy, expanded conversation measures, the
use of alternative fuels and sharper competition among the
oil producers. Price cutting is spreading both inside and
outside OPEC. Before the OPEC unilateral price reduction
from $34 to $29 a barrel in March of 1983, Iran was believed
to be selling oil for 26 dollars a barrel to raise money to
pay for its war with Iraq. Mexico was reported to be
selling oil to the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve for 24
dollars and Egypt was expected to be selling its top-quality
crude for 31 dollars. Britain was also selling North Sea
oil below OPEC's bench-mark price of 34 dollars a barrel
[Ref. 129]. The combined effects of conservation and world-
wide recession have left oil prices skidding, creating a
global supply glut where once there was scarcity. The free-
world demand for OPEC oil has dropped from a high of 31 m.b.d.
in 1979, to about 19 million. Oil demand in the noncommunist
world declined 12 percent over a three-year period (1980-82),
from 52 m.b.d. to 46 million barrels a day [Ref. 130].
Adding to OPEC's dilemma is the fact that countries
outside the cartel are pumping more oil than ever before,
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with Mexico and Britain's fields in the North Sea leading
the way. China's output almost certainly will grow and a
vast new field just discovered off the coast eventually may
add substantially to U.S. production [Ref. 131].
Within OPEC, three of its members, Iran, Libya, and
Venezuela openly flout OPEC decrees by boosting their
production well above quotas assigned to them by cartel
decision March 1982.
The oil glut resulting in lower oil prices would benefit
the world economy. Billions of dollars that might have gone
to OPEC producers remain in oil consuming countries if the
price continues to drop. In fact a steep decline in the
cost of oil would give the sluggish American economy a
welcome shot in the arm. Data Resources, Inc., an economic
consulting firm, estimates that a 10 dollar drop in oil
prices would translate into a 2 percent increase in U.S.
industrial production and a 4 percent hike in pre-tax
company profits while boosting the gross national product by
about 1.5 percentage points [Ref. 132]. For consumers every
1 dollar drop in the price of a barrel saves them about 2
billion dollars a year, according to Commerce Department
estimates, or about 9 dollars for each citizen [Ref. 133].
Additionally, a 10 dollar cut in crude-oil rates would mean
that gasoline prices, after falling 10 cents a gallon in
1982, could decline 20 cents more— a drop that would more
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than offset the impact of the new 5 cent a gallon gas hike
[Ref. 134].
George James, Senior Vice President of the Air Transport
Association of America, estimates that a 6 cent decline in
jet-fuel prices in 1982 already has saved the airline
industry 600 million dollars. In addition, says Wharton
analyst Mark French, a 5 dollar drop in oil prices would
create roughly 400,000 new jobs in the U.S. by the end of
1983 [Ref. 135].
The so called "glut" in supply or in high levels of
inventories in 1981 is not to be judged a signal of a
permanent reverse in the market. It can be ascribed to the
recession (in part brought on by energy price increases),
efforts at conservation, commercial and strategic stock-
piling, and the willingness of primarily Saudi Arabia to
increase exports, thus helping to make up for supply losses
caused by the Iraqi-Iranian war, and to persuade other
producers to agree to the Saudis' pricing formula for
internationally traded oil. Virtually all forecasts for the
1980 's still warn of a general condition of tight supply
[Ref. 136].
C. ORIGIN OF THE OIL GLUT
The salient factors that have contributed significantly
to the glut are: 1. Economic elasticity of market system;
2. Sharply increased oil production from non-OPEC sources;
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3. Decontrol of crude oil; 4. Recession; 5. Drawdown of
inventories; 6. Ineffectiveness of OPEC in agreeing to a
price scale.
The world's appetite for oil has abated more than anyone
dreamed it could a decade ago when it was believed that the
normal laws of supply and demand did not apply, i.e., oil
was thought to be inelastic. However, contrary to many oil
experts predictions, when the price of oil was finally high
enough the laws of supply and demand prevailed. A major
reason for the fall off in oil consumption can be attributed
to the direct effect of higher energy prices as a result of
the marked increases in prices in 1979 and 1980. Rapid
increases in price, coupled with the expectation of higher
prices in the future, induced a massive shift in the market,
i.e., small cars; a reduction in the amount of travel by
automobile; and a proliferation of efficiency improvements
in homes such as shifts away from oil to other fuels
[Ref. 137].
We have had two major price increases. The first one was
in 1973-1974, and the second was more recently, 1979-1980.
In 1973-1974, prices doubled and we paid them. The prices
were paid because they were still low enough that patterns
of oil consumption did not have to be adjusted. This was
reassured by price controls that effectively kept U.S. oil
prices artificially lower than world prices. The story in
1979-1980 was very different. When prices doubled again, it
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did effect U.S. consumption patterns. When gasoline reached
1 dollar a gallon, and it took 20 dollars to fill a tank,
consumers began to change their behavior. People began to
demand smaller cars, consumption began to decline, and
prices began to soften. This is the classical kind of
economic behavior (elastic) one would expect in that
situation
.
The coming to power of the Khomeini regime in Iran
removed about 4 percent of the noncommunist world's oil
supply in 1979; the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in
September 1980 took away another 6 percent. With Iraq's
denunciation, on September 17, 1980, of the Algiers
agreement signed in June 1975 between the Shah of Iran and
Saddam Hessein, 3.8 mmb/d suddenly vanished from the oil
market. Immediately, moderate Gulf states led by Saudi
Arabia increased production to help those consumer countries
most affected by the interruption of Iranian and Iraqi
exports. Although these loses were partly offset by
increases in output in Saudi Arabia and other oil exporting
countries, the net effect was a loss of 4 mmb/d in oil
availability between late 1978 and early 1981. As a result,
long-term contract prices for market crude increased from
$14 to $35 per barrel— about a doubling in price dollars.
As a result , economic growth in 1979 and 1980 slowed due to
the higher oil prices. During May 1981, market trends
constantly favored the consumers with demand ranging from 1
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to 2 mmb/d below oil companies estimates. This lack of
demand combined with the partial resumption of Iranian and
Iraqi production contributed to a glut of 2 to 3 mmb/d
[Ref. 138].
A second major reason for the present oil glut is
increased production by non-OPEC producers such as Mexico
and Britain's North Sea production area. With the doubling
of oil prices in 1979-1980, it became economically feasible
to increase oil production and take advantage of the
extremely high oil prices.
TABLE 26
North Sea Production (U.K. and Norway)
mmb/d
1979 1980 1981 1982
2.1 2.2 2.4 2.7
Source: Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith; January
26, 1983.
A third major reason is the decontrol of oil prices in
the U.S. The rapid decline in oil demand since the near
doubling of prices in 1979-1980 has had a dramatic impact on
the oil market. While substantial in and of itself, the
impact of that increase has been intensified in the U.S. as
a result of crude price decontrol. The U.S. market is very
big and because of decontrol has become very responsive to
world market forces. U.S. suppliers and consumers are no
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longer shielded from price movements in the international
oil market. As a result, the U.S. is now allowed to face
market reactions as they occur. When decontrol went into
effect, oil production in the United States increased
because of the oil companies wanting to take advantage of
the high oil prices. Expensive secondary and tertiary
methods of acquiring more oil now became more attractive as
the international oil price more than compensated for the
high cost of pumping. Additionally, decontrol coupled with
high oil prices encouraged U.S. oil companies to drill and
explore for more oil. Decontrol allowed the U.S. to compete
in the international market and as a result more oil was
introduced adding to the glut.
A fourth major reason for the present oil is the world
wide economic recession. Sluggish economic growth is a very
important element contributing to the fall of oil prices.
Some of the reduction in petroleum consumption was due to
the recession, while estimates vary, according to an
American Petroleum Institute study, about 25 percent of the
decrease could be attributed to the recession [Ref. 139].
Because the U.S. imports more oil than any other country, the
reduction in this country's demand because of the recession
had a significant impact on the world oil market. U.S.
reduced consumption made more oil available for the other
oil-importing countries. That in turn, meant that oil
exporting countries including OPEC had to cut their prices
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to compete with each other for sales to oil-importing
countries [Ref. 140]. It is not clear how long it is going
to last, but one thing is certain, when the recession is
over, there will be renewed upward pressure on demand.
Inventories are a significant factor in the oil glut.
Non-Communist world petroleum production in 1981 was 3.6
million barrels per day below 1980 levels due to a drawdown
of world inventories (down 0.6 million barrels per day in
1981 compared to an increase of 0.8 million barrels per day
in 1980) and decrease in consumption of 2.2 mmb/d. The
drawdown in non-Communist world primary stocks (including
both commercial and strategic inventories) is estimated to
be over 200 mmb/d during 1981 [Ref. 141]. The issue is inven-
tory drawndown or buildup by the oil companies must be
viewed mainly in an economic sense not in a national
security sense. The incentives to stockpile oil are:
1. To ensure the supply of oil to affiliates and to honor
contractual obligations. 2. Expectations of supply
interruption. 3. Expections of price increases, which will
lead to inventory profits. Thus stockpiling beyond a certain
strategic level is affected by the perceptions of avail-
ability and price of oil. If the oil market is tight
and prices are rising (and/or are expected to continue to
rise) inventory buildup is a rational economic /strategic
move for the private oil companies. The buildup, itself,
brings further pressure on the market and leads to higher
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prices. This is what happened in 1979. Conversely, if
supplies are abundant and prices are expected to be stable
or declining, there is no incentive to maintain costly
stockpiles and it is rational to draw down stocks— further
weakening the market. Indeed, this is what happened in 1981
and 1982 [Ref. 142]. While prices were rising rapidly in
1979 and 1980, inventories were being built up by at least
2 million barrels a day. Consumption was going down in that
18 month period, so in many respects it was this large
inventory buildup that put the pressure on the market and led
to the doubling in the world oil price [Ref. 143]. Presently
the converse to this situation is happening with oil com-
panies depleting their oil reserves which adds to the oil glut
The sixth reason is the decreased effectiveness of OPEC.
Significantly, OPEC kingpin Saudi Arabia, which in the past
could effectively bring the other OPEC members into line
through overproduction and underpricing policies of its own
has apparently lost its club. The chief reasons for Saudi
Arabia's decrease control are rising non-OPEC production and
the decision of money-short debt ridden members to use
over-production and underpricing policies of their own.
(Saudi Arabia and OPEC discussed in more detail in chapter
IV.)
In sum, the most salient factor contributing to the oil
glut has been the sharp rise in oil prices. As a result,
elastic market forces have prevailed in which demand is
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lower with abundant supply. Higher prices have also contri-
buted to an economic recession which has resulted in a fall
in demand.
D. IS THE GLUT LONG TERM?
With the world in an economic recession, the demand for
oil among the industrial and third world countries has
declined significantly. When the recession bottoms out, the
demand for oil will increase again. At this time the demand
for oil from the industrial countries will receive the
greatest amount of attention as oil experts try to analyze
and predict
.
The major points to be considered when analyzing the long
term prospects for a continuation of the current glut are:
1. Length of recession. 2. Discretionary production of
OPEC. 3. Degree of stock draw downs.
A rapid end to the current worldwide recession would help
end the oil glut. However, the recovery will probably be a
slow but steady process in which the glut will disappear
slowly as economic activity begins to increase. However,
OPEC could help end the glut if it can cooperate on
discretionary production.
Discretionary production of OPEC nations could help
cause the glut to end. The key to discretionary production
is the amount of cooperation that OPEC can maintain. Saudi
Arabia has designated itself as the swing producer and is
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willing to make the largest sacrifice for OPEC ' s latest plan
to work. Therefore the key question becomes if the Saudis
can survive a major cutback in production. A Saudi produc-
tion cut from 10 million to 5 million barrels a day would
cut Saudi revenues in half— from the current $120 billion
a year to around $60 billion a year [Ref. 144], A detailed
analysis of this question is found in Chapter IV which indi-
cates that the Saudis will be able to make the sacrifice.
However, how long before it has an impact on the oil glut
is difficult to predict.
One of the major contributors to the continuing oil glut
is the drawdown of present inventory stocks. Flooding the
market with inventory stocks means that oil companies are
depleting their strategic reserve which is supposed to be
used in time of a critical shortage. The lowered inventory
levels may cause concern whether end-of-year 1982 stocks are
adequate for anticipated requirements. The estimated 2-year
inventory drawdown is expected to lower primary stocks (both
commercial and strategic) from 5.4 billion barrels at the
end of 1980 to 4.5 billion barrels at the end of 1982 [Ref.
145] . As demand for oil increases and prices stabilize and
eventually begin to rise again, oil companies will once
again begin to stockpile oil. This practice will contribute
to a greater demand for oil on the world market.
As demonstrated, the economic recession will end which
will result in a higher demand for oil. This demand for oil
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can be increased even earlier if OPEC can eliminate the
surplus of oil supply through discretionary production. As
the demand begins to increase, oil prices should rise which
should result in oil companies beginning to stockpile oil
reserves again which in turn will add to the demand.
E. THE DECEPTIVE GLUT: VULNERABILITIES TO THE U.S.
The oil glut is deceptive because many people do not
recognize the U.S. as still being in a stage of high sensi-
tivity dependence. The conclusion of a new study of OECD '
s
International Energy Agency emphasizes this point by
stating, "the oil glut is a transitory phenomenon. It
conceals a worrisome underlying trend that will be evident
in several years: from the late 1980 's onward, oil supplies
will not be able to keep up with the demand of oil" [Ref.
146]. Dr. Elihu Bergman, Executive Director of Americans
for Energy Independence, warns that the current world oil
outlook is seductively attractive, particularly after nearly
a decade of multiple adversities created by the different
stages of the international energy crisis. The reality is
that whatever the outward manifestations, the medium term
oil outlook still is perilous for U.S. national energy
security [Ref. 147].
It is essential that the various facets of the oil glut
be examined in terms of U.S. national security interests.
Oil companies in 1982 were selling less of their product at
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lower prices. And the resultant reduced cash flow to the
oil industry has affected the companies' ability to explore
for oil. After a year of steady growth in 1981, the number
of active drilling rigs in the United States had fallen by
about 40 percent by mid-July 1982 [Ref. 148]. Cheaper oil
prices have hampered America's push to lessen dependence on
oil imports which cost an estimated 60 billion dollars in
1982. The falling price of oil will make developing large
and expensive new oil fields a difficult proposition. For
example, Atlantic Richfield, at a cost of $8 billion, is
developing a huge new Alaska source, called the Kuparuk
Field, which should be producing 250,000 barrels of oil per
day by 1986 or 1987. Atlantic Richfield states they may not
go ahead with this project if the price continues to
fluctuate between $15 and $30 per barrel [Ref. 149].
Despite the current oversupply of oil, the industry still
believes there will be shortages in the future [Ref. 150].
Oil's share of Western energy demand is not likely to drop
below 31 percent by the end of the century, when world
demand could outstrip supply states the International Energy
Agency. World oil demand could reach 50 million to 56
million barrels a day by 1990 and 58 million to 74 million
barrels per day by 2000. Consequently, world demand could
outstrip world oil supplies by as much as 4 mmb/d in 1990
and by 9 mmb/d to 21 mmb/d by 2000 [Ref. 151]. The lEA noted
that falling oil prices could send misleading signals to the
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energy market, causing consumer and investor complacency.
As demonstrated by the reduction of oil companies strategic
inventories and exploration and drilling being reduced in
half, the U.S. is failing to heed the long term warnings of
credible energy analysis. The U.S. is not preparing itself
for the next oil shortage. lEA notes that necessary actions
to overcome difficulties foreseen for the late 1980 's and
1990's may not be taken in time [Ref. 152].
Oil companies are selling their oil stock inventories
because it is economically sound. However, there is a
direct conflict between economically sound measures and what
is in the national interest of the country. Oil prices will
not remain at this lower level forever. If oil prices drop
to the $25-a-barrel level, they would not stay there for
long. Oil is a depletable resource and the price will go
back to the cost of finding the replacement barrel. The
replacement barrel for the U.S. is expensive.
Furthermore, the fact that there is a surplus at the
moment does not guarantee that there will always be one or
that the price will stay down. Saudi Arabia cannot afford
to let OPEC f loundei^ when the Saudis felt that prices were
falling uncontrollably they decided to make a very large
sacrifice to ensure that the prices would rise again and
OPEC would survive. The Saudis are willing to do this
because of the benefits they receive from OPEC (as noted
discussed in detail in Chapter IV) [Ref. 153].
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Net oil imports are projected to continue at significant
levels through at least 1995 in all of the scenarios pre-
sented in the Energy Information Administration 1981 Annual
Report to Congress, Volume 3 . The recent trend toward de-
clining oil imports is projected to reverse. Projected
net oil imports in 1985 range between 6.2 and 8.1 mmb/d
compared to 5.1 mmb/d in 1981. The trend between 1985
and 1995 varies across scenarios, but in no scenario does
net oil imports decline below 2.6 mmb/d [Ref. 154]. The
critical warning is that oil glut or not, energy cannot be
dismissed from our national agenda. An energy supply
artificially expanded by recession simply will not support
economic recovery [Ref. 155].
Two recent studies forecast rising demand for OPEC oil
and a disappearance of the current glut , if and when Western
economies start to grow briskly. One study, prepared by the
Cambridge Energy Research Associated of Cambridge, Mass.,
foresees a possible "exploitation of demand" for OPEC oil
and a resulting shortage as early as 1986, if the world in
general works its way out of recession during 1983. The
second report, issued, by International Energy Agency in
Paris, puts the period of acute shortage toward the end of
this century, assuming that OPEC members, other third world
countries, and industrialized Western nations all increase
their consumption of oil [Ref. 156]. While much has happened
to change our perception of the future, the nature of the
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energy problem has not fundamentally changed. There remain
certain basic realities that we cannot afford to ignore.
One fact of paramount importance is that the U.S. has
substantially reduced its dependence on foreign oil over the
past two years. Another is that oil imports still are high,
amounting to nearly one-third of the oil consumed in this
country. A third fact is that much of that oil comes from
the Middle East [Ref. 157]. Given the nation's continued
dependence on oil from the volatile Middle East and the fact
that sensitivity dependence is still high indicates that the
U.S. is still very vulnerable to oil supply disruptions
[Ref. 158].
Despite the present oil glut , the danger remains of a
sudden cutoff of oil supplies which would imperil the
economies and security positions of the United States and
its allies. Because of our scale of energy consumption, the
U.S. would ultimately bear the brunt of a cutoff. Indeed,
insofar as the prevailing surplus conditions lead us to
relax efforts on oil conservation and development of
alternate fuels, the glut increases rather than diminishes
our vulnerability in the event of a major oil disruption
[Ref. 159].
The market environment and the related physical
conditions of oil supply and demand are not the controlling
and relevant determinants of reliable oil availability. The
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key factor in the oil equation is the political environment
prevailing on the Persian Gulf. Sudden changes in this
unpredictable and volatile environment would create
interruptions in the oil marketplace that would impose
serious consequences [Ref. 160].
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IV. CONTINGENCIES AS A RESULT OF OIL DEPENDENCE
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will examine the potential threats of oil
supply disruptions from the Middle East oil producing
countries. Three mechanisms of supply disruption can be
identified: 1. Deliberate manipulation by producers
motivated by potential political gain or profit (as in
1973-1974). 2. Soviet interference with or influence over
oil supplies. 3. Non-Deliberate: Reduction in supply as
a result of conflict among governments in the region which
interferes with oil production or shipments (i.e., a
conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia). Or a reduction in
supply as a consequence of loss of governmental control and
internal chaos (i.e. Iran in 1979).
B. CONTINGENCIES: DELIBERATE USE OF OIL AS A POLITICAL
WEAPON
Saudi Arabia as one of the founders of OPEC and tradi-
tional OPEC leader is the key to the question, will OPEC
use oil as a political weapon in the future? The reason
Saudi Arabia is the Middle East leader is because it
sits atop of the largest known reserves of oil in the world.
In recent years, the Saudi kingdom has been the leading
exporter of oil and has generated enormous wealth. The
Saudis have been able to gain prestige in the Middle East by
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spreading their oil wealth to other Gulf countries and by
being the leader in the stand against the U.S. in the 1973
crisis. Saudi Arabia also derives its influence in the
Middle East and the world energy market from its ability
to vary rates of oil production from a low about 3 million
bpd to a maximum of over 10 million bpd.
Two questions arise: is it in Saudi Arabia's interest
to support OPEC and if it is should the Saudis encourage or
discourage the use of the OPEC oil weapon? It is in Saudi
Arabia's interest to continue to support OPEC. The major
reasons for Saudi Arabia backing OPEC would be the long
range political, economic, and prestige generated by OPEC '
s
continued success.
One of Saudi Arabia's long range reasons for backing OPEC
is political. In general, the regional effects of oil
wealth has been a deradicalizat ion of the Middle East
governments [Ref. 161]. This more conservative trend has
tended to give the region more stability and is a direct
result of OPEC which has generated enormous revenues. With
a successful OPEC stabilizing oil prices, workers and money
have a greater propensity to flow from one country to
another. Despite the efforts of political leaders to thwart
attempts of unity, this economic integration spills over to
political integration.
In sum it is important for Saudi Arabia to have OPEC
continue as a viable institution because OPEC enhances oil
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wealth which is linked to an increase in economic integra-
tion that tends to cause political integration and
stability. Without the cooperation of OPEC, the threat of
intense price cutting and competition for oil wealth would
cause an increase instability in the Middle East which would
not be in Saudi Arabia's national interest.
Economically without OPEC it is quite possible that the
situation could reverse back to the time when oil companies
were exploiting the oil producing countries at will. Saudi
Arabia remembers well the Iranian experience in 1950-1951,
and the Arab embargo of 1956 in which the oil companies were
very successful in offsetting lower production on one
country by a larger offtake from the others.
Additionally the Saudis remember the oil companies
strategy in 1959 when faced by a glut in the market they
reduced posted prices in hopes of driving off independent
competitors and improving their own profit intake.
OPEC has been most important in influencing oil prices
from decreasing as they did in 1959 when the oil companies
reduced the posted price. Without the actions OPEC took in
1973, it was predicted that OPEC ' s output at the implied
constant real price of crude was expected to reach 48.5
million b.p.d. by 1980. Because of OPEC, the OPEC
production in 1980 was only 26.9 million b.p.d. OPEC is
necessary to help ensure that Saudi Arabia will be able to
help mitigate future exploitation.
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The Saudis could lower its prices and increase produc-
tion anytime it wanted to. The reason it doesn't is because
OPEC serves as a cloak in reducing the many pressures the
Saudies encounter. For example the Saudis can hide among
OPEC when the U.S. puts pressure on them to reduce prices
or increase production, i.e., the same cloak principle
applies if the PLO is pressuring them.
The existence of OPEC continues to generate prestige for
Saudi Arabia. They gained prestige in the eyes of the Arab
world for standing up to the U.S. concerning Israel by
financially supporting Egypt in 1973. Even though they did
not win the war, they at least tried which gave them
prestige in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia has continued to
maintain its prestige in the Arab world by spreading its
oil wealth to other countries. A successful OPEC would en-
sure at least a moderate price which would allow the Saudis
to continue to gain the necessary revenue to support the
spreading of oil wealth. Saudi Arabia assumes that if OPEC
folds their ability to earn the same revenues would diminish
and consequently their spreading of oil wealth would
decrease thus decreasing their prestige.
The Saudis present role in supporting OPEC is very
likely to enhance their prestige even more. The Saudis
have been very reluctant to support the tremendous OPEC
price hikes that could possibly cause what is being ex-
perienced today, an oil glut. The Saudis have argued for a
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moderate policy with the long range goals of gradual price
hikes that are not associated with disruptions and crisis.
The Saudis have also warned that too high of price would
enhance development of synthetic fuels. Therefore when OPEC
emerges from their present crisis, it is very possible
Saudi Arabia will also emerge with greater prestige for
having seen the pitfalls of not following a moderate
policy.
Saudi Arabia's present support for OPEC will also
maintain the prestige with the U.S. As demonstrated
earlier, a viable OPEC allows a greater economic cooperation
in the Middle East and also allows the Saudis to generate
the necessary revenues to continue the spreading of their
oil wealth. If OPEC fails, it could cost the U.S. alot
more in security arrangements. For example, in the Iraq-
Iran war, if Saudi Arabia was not able to support Iraq, the
U.S. might have to support Iraq more directly which might
not be possible with the constraints of Congress. In
effect, the Saudis realize that they are not only ensuring
the stability of the region but they are also doing a service
to the U.S. by supporting Iraq which in turn maintains the
Saudi prestige with the U.S.
Saudi Arabia has come under heavy pressure from Arab
radicals to use the oil weapon for the PLO cause. Saudi
Arabia has been careful to avoid using the oil weapon
because it would lower the prestige it has gained with the
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U.S. (and might not be effective with the formation of
I.E. A. and strategic stockpiling efforts). However, it
does not want to lose the prestige of the Arab world by
reducing the possibility of using the oil weapon with a
statement saying that the Saudis are unlikely to support
using oil as a leverage because it is not in their best
interest. The point here is that the Saudis might not
ever want to use the oil weapon again but to maintain the
Arab prestige they must at least appear to be able to make
a credible threat against the U.S.
In sum, it is very unlikely that Saudi Arabia would
support the use of the oil weapon in the future even though
they continue to support OPEC. Therefore, the threat of a
deliberate interruption of Middle East oil for political or
monetary gain is not likely.
C. CONTINGENCIES: DELIBERATE SOVIET INTERVENTION
One of the most complex issues the allies face is how to
deal with the energy problem that the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe are certain to face, in a way that minimizes
the danger to European and Middle Eastern security. No one
doubts that the Soviet petroleum, coal, and nuclear indus-
tries face formidable problems, and no one knows if the
Soviet Union can solve these problems quickly enough. That
the Soviets will experience a shortfall in domestic oil
production is almost certain. How large a shortfall is a
matter for intense speculation [Ref. 162].
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The critical policy questions confronting the U.S.
government and its major allies center on what actions they
should take if the Soviet energy situation transforms the
USSR from a sizable oil exporter (3 mmb/d) to a net oil
importer. According to Center Intelligence Agency estimates,
the Soviet Union has vast reserves of energy including
proved oil reserves of 33.5 billion barrels, roughly the
same as proved U.S. reserves [Ref. 163]. In a series of
reports that began in 1977, the CIA startled the inter-
national energy community by projecting that the Soviet
Union would cease being a sizable net oil exporter and
become a sizable net oil importer by 1985. These predic-
tions have yet to come to pass but seemed influential in
stimulating the Soviets to conserve and accelerate oil
production in Western Siberia.
Despite a new Spring 1981 CIA estimate, which revised
prior 1985 "low range" output figures from 8-10 mmb/d to
10-11 mmb/d, the Communist bloc's energy future is still
uncertain. The announcement by the USSR that 1981 oil
exports to Western Europe would be reduced by 20-25 percent
was a clear indication of a desperate energy situation [Ref.
164] .
The level of Soviet energy production in the 1980 's will
greatly affect global security. One solution for the
Soviets is to obtain oil from the Persian Gulf. As oil
production in the USSR slides toward 10 mmb/d, Western
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intelligence services should expect increased covert
activity in the Persian Gulf region and North Africa and
gradually increasing Soviet naval movements in the northwest
quadrant of the Indian Ocean [Ref. 165].
The Soviets not only have the option of invading the
Persian Gulf but also using a low level intervention,
perhaps through surrogates, to accomplish control over the
Persian Gulf region, i.e., the Iranian Tudeh Party
(especially in Southwest Iran), could effectively be used.
Secretary of Defense Weinberger, has declared that one
of the most important "geopolitical realities" for the
United States is "our dependence of foreign oil sources."
He added, "The umbilical cord of the industrialized free
world runs through the Strait of Hormuz into the Arabian
Gulf and the nations which surround it. That area... is and
wilJL be the fulcrum of contention in the future" [Ref. 166].
The Soviet threat to move into the Persian Gulf region is
a possibility and U.S. planners have developed the Rapid
Deployment Force as a deterrent. However, U.S. planners
have yet to develop a deterrent against the most likely
threat to Middle East oil supplies, i.e., non deliberate
oil crisis.
D. CONTINGENCIES: NON DELIBERATE
The most viable threat to an interruption of Middle East
oil is a non deliberate action. One danger concerns the
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internal stability of the key oil-producing countries. A
recent report warned, "There are at least half a dozen
countries in the area whose regimes must be regarded as
precarious in a ten-year perspective" [Ref. 167]. Cer-
tainly, instability in key oil producers threatens both
oil supply and regional equilibrium. Revolutions, terrorism,
coups, or social upheavals that give way to anti-Western
regimes pose a threat to the West. Such changes would add
to the "hostile oil," oil produced by countries fundamentally
antagonistic to the West [Ref. 168].
The second danger is regional conflict, for the rivalries
in the area are many and varied—the Arabs versus Israel,
Iran versus Iraq, Syria versus Iraq, Egypt versus Libya,
South Yemen versus Saudi Arabia, Christians versus Moslems
in Lebanon, radical versus traditional, Sunni versus
Shi'ite, and so on. These rivalries can result in
hostilities, which can threaten the oil supply and which can
set off the trigger that draws the superpowers into
conflict. The vast influx into the region of advanced
weaponry, the best that East and West have to offer, has
added to the volatility [Ref. 169]. Accidents or sabotage
could lead to a sudden loss of oil production. In May 1977
a fire at Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia, very nearly caused the loss
of several million bpd for as much as one year [Ref. 170].
Accidents, sabotage, regional conflict and instability
of regimes are the greatest threat to oil supplies. These
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non deliberate contingencies can come at any time and are
very unpredictable. Thus the need to be prepared for




V. LINKAGE BETWEEN U.S. GOALS AND POLICIES
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will focus on the U.S. national goals and
the linkage between goals and policy. Stalking the United
States of the 1980 's is an illusion that threatens the
economic stability and security interests of this country
and indeed the world far more than the global aggrandizement
of Soviet power. The illusion has touched all regions of
the country and all socioeconomic classes, transcending
partisan politics and reaching into the highest levels of
the executive and legislative branches of government and the
boardrooms of domestic and international corporations. It
is the illusion that the energy crisis is essentially behind
us and that we can relax and let market forces solve our
energy dilemma [Ref. 171]. The theme of this chapter is
that even though our leaders have made the link between
energy and national security, our present energy policies
still leaves the United States unprepared for oil import
disruptions.
B. STATEMENT OF NATIONAL GOALS
President Reagan has stated, "Our National Energy policy
dictates that one of government's chief energy roles is to
guard against sudden interruption of energy supplies. . .We
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will ensure that our people and our economy are never again
held hostage by the whim of any country or cartel" [Ref.
172].
The United States has become increasingly dependent on
oil as a major supplier of U.S. energy needs. During the
last decade there has been a large increase in U.S. depen-
dence on oil from the Middle East and African nations.
In 1970, oil from these nations made up 10 percent of U.S.
imports and 2 percent of total petroleum supplies. By 1980,
this share had grown to about 50 percent of imports and
nearly 25 percent of total supplies. Unfortunately, military
conflicts, terrorism, and political instability have been
commonplace in these areas and pose a well recognized threat
to oil exports. Four disruptions in oil exports from the
Middle East within the past eight years bear witness to this
danger: A politically motivated, selective embargo by
Arab oil exporters beginning in late 1973, the loss of
Iranian oil exports due to internal turmoil both in 1978 and
in 1979, and Iraq-Iran war in 1980-1981 [Ref. 173].
As a result of U.S. dependence on insecure oil supplies
from the Middle East, the national goal of U.S. energy
policy since the early 1970 's has been to reduce U.S.
vulnerability to an interruption in oil supplies.
Thus the primary focus of U.S. energy policy development,
beginning with Project Independence in 1973 through passage
of the Energy Security Act of 1980, has been on reducing
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import dependence. Despite these important efforts, energy-
analysts now generally agree that, due to the lead times
involved, the nation will still remain dependent on
substantial volumes of oil imports for at least the next
decade or two. Moreover, even if the nation could somehow
achieve independence from imports, U.S. allies and major
trading partners would still be heavily dependent on
imported oil. Economic links and oil sharing agreements
with these nations would make it highly unlikely that the
United States could escape the effects of a major world oil
supply disruption [Ref. 174].
In broad terms, the national goals concerning energy
security are quite adequate. All our leaders have
recognized that oil security is one of our nation's highest
priorities. The continuing major problem facing our leaders
is determining the degree of energy security needed to
ensure that our national goals are met. It is my premise
that the critical link between our national energy goals and
policies has not been achieved. Furthermore, the policies
needed to cement a strong bond for this critical link have
yet to be implemented because the U.S. fails to recognize
that it is still very vulnerable to oil supply disruptions.
Present administration policies will never address these
vulnerabilities sufficiently because they rely on market
forces which economically will not support expensive alter-
native energy developments. Energy security can be assured
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if one is willing to pay the price. It is my contention
that an effective compromise can be employed which incor-
porates market forces to a degree, but also allows the
development of pilot plans in synthetic fuels which take
as long as seven to ten years to mature.
C. U.S. PRESENT STRATEGY: WHAT PROPELS IT?
The present Reagan administration's energy security
policy is heavily reliant on market forces. The administra-
tion believes that it is time to refocus world attention on
the ability of market forces to locate siipplies of energy
and deliver them to consumers. The administration believes
that the oil market is no different than any other market.
A State Department summary on U.S. energy strategies states,
"the United States will rely to maximum extent possible on
market forces to solve problems. Permitting producers and
consumers to exercise their own ingenuity and market pre-
ferences in responding to supply interruptions may seem
painful in the short term, but we believe it will substan-
tially reduce medium and longer term damage to economic
welfare" [Ref. 175].
However, the administration does recognize the need to
have some exceptions to their hands off approach. The
government must assume at least partial responsibility for
stockpiling emergency oil supplies. The State Department
states, "For military, political, and economic reasons, we
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cannot afford to "run out" of this indispensable commodity,
no matter how remote the possibility may seem" [Ref. 176].
D. IS THE MARKET FORCES APPROACH ENSURING U.S. SECURITY?
On March 7, 1983, Energy Secretary Donald Hodel said
that the Reagan administration's reliance on free market
supply and demand may not be sufficient to meet an energy
crisis. Hodel stated, "officials are concerned about the
ability of the emergency (petroleum) resources to function
without some legislative assistance" [Ref. 177]. Committee
Chairman Senator James McClure of the Senate Energy and
Natural Resources Committee expressed skepticism about the
administration's ability to deal with a disruption of
imported petroleum. Senator McClure also stated that he was
heartened by Hodel 's remarks because it was the first time
the administration had publicly conceded that more than its
free market approach may be necessary. Backed by a General
Accounting Office report accusing the administration of
having no real standby plans to counter an energy crisis,
McClure said he did not think a crisis could be solved
by allowing market forces to determine price and availability
of fuel [Ref. 178]
.
Whatever the outstanding fanciful notions about the
capabilities of the marketplace, the marketplace cannot
provide an emergency preparedness system. The market environ-
ment and the related physical conditions of oil supply and
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demand are not the controlling and relevant determinants of
reliable oil availability. The key factor in the oil
equation is the political environment prevailing on the
Persian Gulf [Ref. 179]. F. Henry M. Schuler, director for
energy planning and development in the Washington national
affairs office of Deloitte Haskins and Sells, states, "I am
convinced that the international energy market is not
governed by the commercial and competitive forces that are
customarily attributed to a free market. Therefore, I am
concerned that total neglect—no matter how benign—will also
impede development of domestic resources" [Ref. 180].
Schuler goes on to say that reliance on a free market pre-
supposes that the market is governed by economic and commer-
cial considerations enshrined in the law of supply and
demand, i.e., the rule of price optimization by a rational
monopolist. These traditional verities lend themselves
nicely to computer modeling, but they have little influence
outside of the spot market that represents only a tiny
portion of the international energy market. The interna-
tional oil market lacks at least three characteristics
associated with a free or competitive market: its driving
forces are largely political rather than commercial; access
to entry is often limited by discriminatory restrictions;
and free competition is thwarted by foreign government
subsidization of national oil companies. Schuler concludes
his argument by stating that, "In my judgment, these flaws
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are so significant that U.S. national security interest
cannot be protected through a policy of benign neglect
toward the energy market" [Ref. 181].
As demonstrated, market forces is what is propelling
U.S. national interest in the world oil market. It is
apparent that the administration believes market forces
will work because it assumes world free market exist.
Unfortunately, U.S. energy security is based upon an assump-
tion which is not true.
An excellent example of the inadequacy of relying on
market forces to ensure U.S. security is the continued
production of the Naval Petroleum Strategic Reserves. The
basic problem hinges on the relative importance one attaches
to strategic value versus economic benefits. In terms of
linking policies to goals, one can ask the question, Is the
continued production of the Naval Petroleum Strategic
Reserves in the national interest?
The Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves were
established early in this century as an emergency source of
petroleum for the U.S. Navy. Very little developmental
activity occurred until World War II when the largest
Petroleum Reserve, Elk Hills in California, was activated to
supply oil for the Navy's Pacific Campaign, reaching a
production level of 65,000 barrels per day. After the war,
it was deactivated and all of the Reserves remained
essentially inactive and shut in until the Arab oil Embargo
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of 1973-74 prompted Congressional authorization of funding
for their full development. Then in 1976, with develop-
mental work in progress, Congress passed the Naval Petroleum
Reserves Production Act which contained several significant
provisions. It authorized and directed the Secretary of the
Navy to place the Reserves on production at the maximum
efficient rate for a period of six years, with the petroleum
to be sold competitively on the open market. The major
reason for production was to generate revenues which would
fund development costs of placing the reserves in full
operating capacity. The actual revenues were sent to the
Treasury Department which then allocated the money for
development [Ref. 182].
During this six year period, the goal of placing the
reserves in full operating capacity was achieved and by 1981
production peaked at over 180,000 billion barrels and
production capacity.
In 1981, the Reagan administration had to make a decision
as to whether to discontinue to pump the nation's Strategic
oil reserve that now was prepared to provide insurance
against U.S. vulnerability by its capability to augment
domestic oil production during an oil crisis or war
situation.
The strategic value of Naval Petroleum Reserve number 1,
(Elks Hills), is without question. In the vernacular of the
petroleum industry, it is a "giant" field with remaining
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recoverable oil reserves of more than 1.25 billion barrels
and a production capacity in the United States second only
to Prudhoe Bay in Alaska. It clearly has the potential,
therefore, to provide the Nation with a significant stra-
tegic reserve of petroleum if production is shut in [Ref.
183].
It should be noted that the Naval Strategic Oil Reserve
was designed to serve the purpose of protecting the Nation
during a major oil interruption. During Wartime, a
sever interruption would impact the Nation's ability to
sustain a conventional military action, and without a snut
in ready reserve capacity for emergency oil production,
might place the U.S. in a position of terminating the
action prematurely before strategic goals are met or
escalating to a nuclear war [Ref. 184]. During peacetime,
a sever interruption could cause economic and social hard-
ship on the Nation, and reduction of military training and
readiness. The intent of the Naval Strategic Reserve is .
to ensure that the military forces have adequate petroleum
supplies available and to sustain the military during
peacetime interruptions. The NPR is designed to offer a
substantial complement to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve
[Ref. 185].
The Navy recommended to reduce or shut in production of
the NPR. However, the President decided to keep pumping the
reserves. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees
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and the House Energy Committee held hearings to review the
President's decision to continue to pump the NRP for another
three years. As a result of the hearings, the House Armed
Services Committee approved a resolution to shut in the
reserves. That resolution was referred to the Rules
Committee and never came to a floor vote as a result of
heavy lobbying by the administration and the California
Congressional delegation. Accordingly, the Petroleum
Reserves will be produced at least until April 1985 which
further degrades the NPR defense emergency capability
[Ref. 186].
The reason the NPR were allowed to continue to produce
is economical. The revenues of the Reserves goes to the
Treasury and offsets the Federal budget. The Reagan
administration estimated that shutting in the NPR would
result in a loss of $.9 billion in FY 1982, $1.6 billion in
FY 1983, and $1.3 billion in FY 1984. Including the effects
of inflation, the revenue loss would approximate $4.5
billion over this period [Ref. 187].
The Department of Energy stated that the potential
benefits of shutting in of the NPR-1 is not in the national
interest because the potential benefits during an oil supply
interruption to supplement the drawdown of the Strategic
Petroleum Reserves measured against the eiconomic benefits is
not cost effective [Ref. 188].
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The market forces approach to national security is
ineffectual because one cannot measure the utility or cost
effectiveness of protecting one's national interest in
dollars until one neglects to prepare. Then the conse-
quences can be measured in dollar amounts, but it will be
too late to prepare for vulnerabilities once they are
occurring.
By continuing to pump our Strategic Reserves and
raising money for the national debt, we are neglecting a
major problem which will have to be faced soon. That is by
pumping our reserves less imported oil comes into the
country. As the reserves are depleted, the country will
have to depend on greater amounts of imports to meet the
country's needs that are being supplied in part by the
continued production of the reserves. Instead of looking
at the strategic consequences of this practice, the adminis-
tration is only concentrating on a short-term cost effec-
tiveness which is falsely leading the country to believe
that its vulnerability has been reduced when in fact the
country is more vulnerable because it is depleting its
Strategic Oil Reserves and soon will be depending on more
imports
.
E. UNITED STATES REMAINS UNPREPARED FOR OIL IMPORT
DISRUPTIONS
A General Accounting Office report stated, "The U.S.
Government is almost totally unprepared to deal with
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disruptions in oil imports. Oil import disruptions such as
the 1973 oil embargo and the 1979 Iranian shortfall pose a
significant threat to national security, and the lack of
effective contingency planning and program development to
date is serious and requires immediate attention. The
Government must make a determined commitment to emergency
preparedness now, while oil markets are slack, to prepare
for any future disruption" [Ref. 189].
With the exception of the recent buildup of the Stra-
tegic Petroleum Reserve, the United States is no better pre-
pared to deal with significant disruptions in oil imports
than it was during the 1973 oil embargo [Ref. 190]. The
Nation's almost total lack of emergency preparedness requires
immediate attention. The GAO report states, the inadequate
state of the Nation's emergency preparedness eight years
after the 1973 embargo is a serious problem requiring
immediate attention. We believe the Federal Government
should take prompt and concerted action to counter this
serious potential threat to national security [Ref. 191].
The basic objective of the GAO study was to evaluate the
present U.S. energy preparedness planning for oil import
disruptions. As a benchmark, 3 mmb/d was selected as an oil
supply disruption amount. Three mrab/d was selected because
it would trigger the use of the lEA emergency oil sharing
system. The United States is a member of the lEA and has
important obligations to it which significantly affect the
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design and operation of all U.S. contingency programs. The
conclusion of this shortfall is that the United States would
be lucky to offset one-third of the shortfall with programs
now in hand. Even more depressing is the fact that several
of the estimates which account for the modest offsets are
optimistic [Ref. 192]. A summary of the present deficiencies
are as follows:
1. Surge oil production: No plan has been prepared
and several legal constraints must be removed.
2. Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Although oil is now
being acquired at a reasonable rate, we have too
little oil in the SPR and have not developed an
adequate plan for SPR oil acquisition and use.
3. Private Stocks: The Government has not finalized
plans prepared for managing stock drawdown.
4. Oil-to-gas switching: Some progress has been made,
but the plan still has significant weaknesses.
5. Oil-to-coal switching: An effective plan is not even
close to completion.
6. Federal Demand Restraint: The current Federal plan
is totally inadequate and the legal framework for
demand restraint is impractical.
7. International emergency reserves: Members of the
lEA, including the United States, do not have nearly
adequate emergency reserves.
8. International oil sharing: The present system holds
promise but is too narrowly focused and is also
plagued by implementation problems
Conclusion: Could the U.S. cope with a 3 mmb/d shortfall
today? No! The U.S. is still grossly unprepared [Ref. 193].
The Federal Government does not presently have an emergency
plan adequate to cope with a sudden and substantial shortage
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of imported oil. As a result, measures taken in the wake of
a shortfall are likely to be ad hoc, experimental, full of
interagency confusion, and poorly coordinated with emergency
measures undertaken by the States [Ref. 194].
F. STRATEGIC STOCKPILING: THE DOD IS STILL VULNERABLE
In order to diminish U.S. vulnerability to the effects of
a severe oil supply interruption and to carry out U.S.
international energy commitments, the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act authorized the creation of an SPR to store
up to 1 billion barrels of crude oil.
The stockpiling of emergency reserves is meant to deter
the intentional cutoff for oil supplies to the United
States; more important, its purpose is to lessen the shock
of a disruption, to maintain the viability of the national
economy in the absence of critical oil imports. Unfortunate-
ly SPR has run into more than its share of problems, chief
among them a recurrent tendency to stop filling it or to
fill it at a slower rate [Ref. 195].
However, there is serious doubt that the SPR could
maintain the viability of the national economy in the
absence of critical oil imports and simultaneously support
the needs of the DOD. Captain G. R. Gilmore, Director, Naval
Petroleum and Shale Reserves and Emergency Preparedness,
recently expressed his concern by stating, "As Director,
Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves, I am especially
143

concerned that sufficient fuel may not be available to meet
our national defense requirements during a wartime situa-
tion [Ref. 196]. Captain Gilmore was referring to the grave
situation in which all the Naval Petroleum Reserves are
producing at their maximum efficient rates with the revenues
going to the treasury coupled with the inability of the SPR
to handle DOD needs during a major conflict.
The Strategic Petroleum Reserve is not designed to meet
military needs effectively; it is not available for wartime
use unless there is a severe petroleum supply disruption;
and it will not be large enough to meer both civilian and
military needs in the event of an oil supply disruption
associated with a major war [Ref. 197].
Unfortunately, the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, as it is
now being developed, does not reflect any specific needs of
the DOD. The SPR clearly is designed to be a civilian
reserve, and is not capable of meeting DOD needs in most
national security emergencies [Ref. 198]. The SPR size has
been determined primarily on the basis of the economic
benefits of the Reserve in responding to a disruption of oil
imports; non-economic national security benefits have been
given little or no consideration in setting the size of the
SPR [Ref. 199]. It has not been sized to meet the national
security needs of the country in the event of a less likely,
but more devastating, severe oil supply disruption associated
with a major war. SPR size decisions have not recognized
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the non-economic benefits or a reserve, including saving
lives, reducing panic, providing foreign policy flexibility,
and protecting our freedoms.
The availability of adequate quantities of DOD petro-
leum products was renewed during and after the 1979
Iranian disruption. During this period it became difficult
for DOD to purchase petroleum as needed, and oil prices
far exceeded amounts in DOD budgets for petroleum. As a
result of this experience, a portion of Naval Petroleum
Reserves production was provided to DOD to help meet their
continuing requirements, but only about a third of DOD '
s
peacetime requirements can be met from current NPR pro-
duction [Ref. 200]. DOD is currently using approximately
490,000 barrels per day of fuel and of this amount, is
buying and trading 130,000 b/d of crude oil from the NPR
[Ref. 201]. The DOD acquires the rest of its oil needs
by buying oil on the open market with some of this oil
coming from oil imports. This is a major point because
DOD assumes that the oil they acquire from the SPR will be
supplemented with oil imports. This assumption may be
just wishful thinking in the event of a major conflict.
As noted, the Department of Defense and its operating
contractors consume approximately 0.5 million barrels per
day (mmb/d) of petroleum products, under normal peacetime
conditions. In the event of a major conventional war, DOD
petroleum usage could increase to 1.5 mmb/d or higher.
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An assured supply of petroleum products when needed is
essential for maintaining military response readiness and
to permit effective prosecution of any military operation
[Ref. 202]. A major war in the Persian Gulf area could
create this situation whereby DOD petroleum requirements
would increase to over 1.5 mmb/d in conjunction with the
loss of up to 20 mmb/d in world oil production by countries
in the area [Ref. 203]. U.S. allies, including Japan,
Germany, and France, would suffer very large reductions in
their total oil supplies because of their heavy dependence
on oil imports.
At the same time, a war could increase oil demand by the
United States and its allies by up to 2 mmb/d. This could
result in an almost complete loss of oil imports for the
U.S. if we were to share available world oil supplies with
Europe, Japan and other countries on some equitable basis.
The U.S. could lose about 5 mmb/d of oil imports, as well
as being faced with an increase in demand of 1 mmb/d for
defense activities [Ref. 204].
With such a loss, a 750 million barrel SPR with a maxi-
mum drawdown capability of less than 4.5 mmb/d would not be
able to meet daily demands for oil to avoid a severe dis-
ruption of society, and the full reserve could be depleted
in about six months. As the oil shortage deepened, there
would be increasing conflict between military and civilian
demands for available oil. The lack of an adequate oil
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reserve could increase pressures on decision makers to
take more drastic military action than would otherwise be
desired, or to reach a settlement of the conflict in a way
which seriously damages long-term U.S. interests. In sum,
the size of the SPR is inadequate to meet DOD needs [Ref.
205].
Even if the SPR were to be large enough to meet national
security needs, the civilian character of the reserve would
seriously limit its usefulness for defense purposes. For
example, the SPR authorizing legislation allows drawdown of
the SPR only if there is a "severe petroleum supply disrup-
tion." The current SPR authority would not permit use of
the SPR to support increased defense needs even during a
major war, if there were not a severe supply disruption
[Ref. 206]. There also are likely to be difficulties in
gaining access to the SPR oil even when its use by DOD is
authorized, because of administrative delays in selling the
oil or due to competition with other users for access to
available pipeline and tanker dock space [Ref. 207].
Although DOD theoretically could use the Defense Pro-
duction Act authorities to meet all of its petroleum needs
in the private market, such an approach will result in
increasing conflict between military and civilian demands
for petroleum as oil supplies shrink during a severe war/
disruption crisis. The lack of an adequate oil reserve
could increase pressures on decision makers to resolve the
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crisis quickly, by taking more drastic military action than
would otherwise be desired, or by reaching a settlement of
the conflict in a way which seriously damages long-term
U.S. interest [Ref. 208].
In addition to the limitation on when the SPR can be
used, there may be the following problems in using SPR oil
to meet defense needs during wartime: 1. There may be
delays in obtaining a Presidential decision to use the SPR
in view of the multiple and conflicting pressures facing the
President regarding SPR use. 2. There may be delays or
problems due to indecision regarding the method of selling
the oil, including the method of establishing the sales
price and determining who will receive the oil. 3. There
may be delays in gaining access to the oil because DOD would
be competing with other users for access to docks and/or
pipelines to move the oil to refineries. It is difficult
to anticipate the problems that might arise in attempting
to use the SPR to meet DOD needs, but it is clear that DOD
would lack control over the use of the SPR that they would
gain with a designated, separate, single-purpose, defense
reserve [Ref. 209].
G. PROPOSED NEW ENERGY POLICY TO MEET OUR NATIONAL INTEREST
The effort should be made to develop alternative sources
of energy, primarily synthetic fuels (shale oil). Given the
long lead time needed to develop advanced synthetic fuel
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technologies, the process should begin now. National
security alone dictates moving forward, for aside from the
eventual exhaustion of oil supplies (and other fossil fuels)
there remains the danger of becoming hostage to another
politically motivated oil cutoff.
The U.S. is vulnerable to another oil interruption and
with its present free market approach is also unprepared to
deal with this interruption. A much broader approach needs
to be taken which will ensure that the national interest of
the country is adequately being met. An immediate invest-
ment in the shale oil program will do much to alleviate the
vulnerability the U.S. now faces.
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VI. PROPOSED STRATEGY TO REDUCE U.S. VULNERABILITY
A. RECOGNITION OF THE PROBLEMS: SHORT TERM AND LONG TERM
1. Short Term Problem
A detailed examination of the U.S. response to the
1973-74 and 1979-80 oil crises followed by a critical look
at the present oil glut and inadequacies of the free market
approach to energy security was to demonstrate the serious
concern one should have about U.S. energy emergency pre-
paredness. Unfortunately, the recent OPEC developments
of lowering the base price of crude oil encourages com-
placency with the prevailing surplus conditions. The
glut may well prove to be a setback in the effort to ensure
U.S. energy security.
In light of this growing optimism, the U.S. is
still vulnerable to oil supply interruptions and response
preparedness programs are not comprehensive enough to cope
with future oil crises. The present emergency programs do
not addquately cope with the inability of the economy and
the DOD to adjust rapidly to major oil interruptions without
substantial losses to the economy and efficiency to the DOD.
Obviously the development of adequate levels of petroleum
stocks that can be drawn down in an emergency is one of the
most direct and effective solutions to the problem because
it reduces the size of the adjustment required.
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The SPR in theory is the answer to adjusting rapidly
to oil supply disruptions. In addition to the SPR if
matters are grave enough, the government could go to a
rationing program and even nationalize domestic oil produc-
tion to meet both DOD and civilian needs. As noted earlier,
the SPR is presently dedicated to civilian needs. To
utilize SPR oil, DOD must convince Congress it is necessary
to acquire oil from the SPR using the Defense Allocation
Act. Without question, if the situation merits it,
Congress would allocate oil from the SPR to DOD. The
problem is the time element involved.
During a major crisis, the most important logistic
response is immediate surge production. Drawdown capability
of established reserves must be able to meet the needs of
DOD and civilian sector immediately. Nationalizing oil
companies and rationing do not solve the surge production
problem.
In sum, during the oil glut, the public and govern-
ment has grown complacent and as a result are failing to
recognize that the U.S. lacks the capability to adjust
rapidly to oil interruptions. Compounding this problem is
the reliance of the present administration on the. free
market forces to ensure U.S. security. Free market forces
do not address surge production capacity.
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2 . Long Term Problem
The second major problem is limiting or reducing
oil vulnerability altogether. This is a strategic consi-
deration which must include in its calculus the following
variables: 1. Predictable oil supply (domestic and
foreign) 2. World oil resources 3. U.S. and world
economic growth 4. Alternatives to oil.
One of the major constraints in defining oil in
the national interest is considering all four of the
variables. The problem lies in the nature of the variables
in that they require long-term forecasting and unfortunately
the accuracy of these forecasts is not as high as one would
like. However, this does not preclude the government from
its responsibilities for developing long-term strategic
plans.
A second major constraint in developing strategic
plans is the present administration's adherence to the free
market forces, i.e., \ve depend on the market to allocate
our oil resources on a supply and demand sliding scale.
This approach has precluded the U.S. from developing its
shale oil reserves to reduce its long-term vulnerability.
Shale oil is a synthetic fuel in which the U.S. has some of
the largest reserves in the world. The U.S. has yet to
develop these resources because the OPEC cartel led by
Saudi Arabia has purposely kept the cost of their crude
oil below the cost effective point of producing shale oil.
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B. PROPOSED STRATEGY FOR REDUCING U.S. OIL VULNERABILITY
1. Introduction
The U.S. should pursue some strategic plan which
incorporates the immediate development of these shale oil
reserves. Due to the lead time of five to seven years
involved, immediate construction should begin. Realizing
that if these plants are started today, by the time they
are finished in 5 to 10 years they might be cost effective
in terms of future oil prices and will be on line to pro-
vide oil during an oil crisis. Therefore one must be able
to prove there is a direct need for these plants today. I
realize that this is an indirect way of satisfying the long
term national interest of the country. However, the
immediate constraints are a very real obstacle and must be
considered in the attainment of our goal. The following
strategic plan that will be proposed addresses both the
short term and long term problems previously mentioned.
2. Attainment Strategy
The following strategy addresses the need to solve
the short term problem of lack of surge production. This
proposed strategy not only addresses the short term problem
but is also the fundamental solution to the long term
problem.
The proposed strategy deals with the short term
problem of solving the lack of surge production capability.
The strategic plan involves converting the Naval Petroleum
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and Oil Shale Reserves into a Defense Petroleum Reserve (DPR)
which would be readily usable for national security purposes
during emergencies. This strategic plan meets the need of
solving the shortfall of the DOD depending upon the SPR and
also of the present policy of continuing production of the
Elk Hills Reserve.
As demonstrated, a Defense Petroleum Reserve is needed
to provide an assured source of petroleum of DOD activities
during emergencies, such as military conflicts v/hich could
disrupt the supply of oil from the Persian Gulf region. The
Strategic Petroleum Reserve is not designed to meet military
needs effectively; it is not available for wartime use
unless there is a severe petroleum supply disruption; and it
will not be large enough to meet both civilian and military
needs in the event of an oil supply disruption associated
with a major war.
The DOD and its operating contractors consume
approximately 0.5 mmb/d of petroleum products, under normal
peacetime conditions. In the event of a major conventional
war, DOD petroleum usage could increase to 1.5 mmb/d or
higher. An assured supply of petroleum products when needed
is essential for maintaining military response readiness and
3This section draws heavily on a conceptual plan developed
for Captain Gordon Gilmore, head of the Naval Strategic
Petroleum Reserve. The plan is unpublished by Gilmore,
Hystad, and Ass. December 1982.
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to permit effective prosecution of any military operation.
As demonstrated in Chapter V, section F, the surge capacity
of the SPR is not designed to meet both the DOD and
civilian needs during time of war. With the surge capacity
of the Naval Petroleum Reserves presently diminished because
of present continued production, my attainment strategy is
the development of a DOD reserve.
Developing a DPR would serve two purposes: 1. The
DPR would be used by DOD in national emergencies without
using the SPR. 2. Development of DPR for use as tactical
reserve in peacetime, to minimize the cost of oil to DOD,
and also for use in emergencies.
The first purpose is that the use of the DPR during
times of national emergencies is appropriate due to the
possibility that the SPR is not large enough to meet wartime
surge production for military as well as civilian needs.
Additionally there is likely to be administrative and
logistics delays or problems in using the SPR to meet DOD
needs if such use is necessary.
The second purpose is that using the DPR as a tac-
tical reserve in peacetime and to minimize the cost of oil to
DOD is cost effective. DOD currently is spending about $7
billion per year for petroleum. It now must purchase oil
virtually on a day to day basis to meet continuing needs.
At times it must purchase oil when the market is tight and
spot prices are very high, and it can not take special
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advantage of low prices because it does not have extensive
low cost storage space in which oil can be stockpiled for
use when prices are high. Most suppliers are unwilling to
enter into long-term fixed price contracts with DOD , because
of the instability of world oil prices.
Fluctuations in world oil prices in the past four
years indicate that there is a potential for substantial
savings in DOD petroleum purchases with effective use of a
stockpile system. For example, imported crude oil costs
rose from an average of $14.57 per barrel in late 1978, to
an average of $38.25 per barrel in the first six months of
1981. Oil stored at 1978 prices and used in the first six
months of 1981 would have resulted in savings of about $14.20
per barrel, assuming a 10 percent discount rate. Such
savings would have far exceeded the cost of stockpiling oil
in underground storage, and use of oil stocks during that
period would have reduced demand pressures on world market
prices
.
The price increase between 1978 and 1981 may have
been very exceptional, but price fluctuations of a dollar or
two a barrel are very common. The ability to purchase excess
spot market cargoes at a dollar or two below long term
contract rates and place that oil in temporary storage could
help pay for the cost of an underground storage system
developed primarily for use in emergencies. The incremental
cost of developing a storage system that could be used as an
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operational reserve would be small; during the years of
developing salt cavern storage, the withdrawal of oil
would help expand the size of the caverns at minimal in-
cremental costs.
The incremental cost of using storage facilities for
an operational reserve as well as an emergency reserve is
estimated to be about $.50 per barrel, to cover the cost of
moving oil into and out of the storage site. Assiiming that
oil placed in temporary storage could be purchased for an
average of $2.00 per barrel below normal market rates, and
that the oil remained in storage for an average of three
months, the temporary storage could provide net benefits of
$.70 per barrel, assuming a 10 percent discount rate.
It is noted that it would not be cost effective to
develop a storage system solely to take advantage of normal
fluctuations in oil prices. If a discount rate of 10
percent assumed, the cost of money and storage facilities
would exceed likely savings in oil cost. The point is that
over the long run having a DPR would allow the DOD to take
advantage of price fluctuations which in turn would allow
substantial savings. However, it should also be noted that
the development of the DPR is not solely on the benefit that
it would reduce cost but more important that it would serve




What is the situation if a separate DPR is not de-
veloped? Without a separate military oil reserve, DOD
would need to rely primarily on open market purchases to ob-
tain the bulk of its oil during emergencies as well as in
peacetime. It may obtain a small portion of its supply from
any continuing NPR production, but available supplies from
the NPR will dwindle to almost nothing by the end of the
century. DOD could employ the Defense Production Act to
try to obtain supplies if the market does not respond.
But direct participation in the oil market to bid supplies
away from other potential users is likely to be the most
successful means of obtaining supplies when needed, if a
separate reserve is not available. Because of the limita-
tions on use of the SPR , and the likely difficulties in
obtaining SPR oil directly for military use on a timely
basis, DOD could not rely on using the SPR for either its
emergency needs or for peacetime requirements.
This option will require that DOD be prepared to
pay whatever price is necessary to purchase its oil needs.
A "budget reserve" to cover higher than expected oil prices
may be desirable if a DPR is not developed. If there are
no major military conflicts associated with a disruption of
oil imports, and no further sudden large increases in oil
prices, this option may be the lowest cost means of meeting
DOD requirements. However, if there are future military
conflicts associated with a disruption of oil imports, this
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option will contribute to sever escalation of oil prices
and disruptions of our economy and society. It also is
likely to increase pressures to reduce military use of oil,
or to attempt high risk solutions to the crisis in order
to bring a quick end to the problem.
In sum, a reserve of petroleum for defense use
could have critical value in the event of a major military
conflict, with or without an associated disruption of oil
imports. It could be particularly critical in the event
of an extended war in the Persian Gulf area that destroyed
major oil production and transportation facilities.
The SPR cannot be relied upon to meet DOD needs,
because of its limited size, restrictions on its use, and the
lack of DOD control over its use. Developing a DPR to meet
the needs that are not fulfilled by the SPR will have bene-
fits that cannot be measured solely in economic terms; the
desirability of an oil reserve available to the military
should be measured in the same way as other national security
systems, including estimates of its benefits in saving
lives, reducing fear, and protecting our freedom. Therefore,
the decision on whether to develop a DPR should be made by
the President and the Congress based on their experienced
judgment of the national security benefits of such a reserve.
The decision should not be based solely on an economic ana-
lysis of the issue, as has been the case with the SPR.
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If a DPR were developed for emergency use, the
storage facilities also could be used as an operational
reserve with very little incremental cost. This could re-
duce the cost of oil to DOD as well as minimizing federal
budget and fiscal problems.
C. BENEFITS OF CONVERTING THE NP&OSR INTO DOD RESERVE
There are two means of developing an emergency defense
petroleum reserve, other than converting the NP&OSR. One
alternative to converting the NPR to a ready defense reserve
would be for DOD to develop a petroleum reserve for its
needs without using NPR revenues. NPR production would
continue and the revenues would be provided to the Treasury.
A second alternative would be to shut in the Naval Reserves
and use them for surge production in emergencies to help
meet DOD needs
.
With the free market forces constraints in mind, the
first alternative is unlikely because the present administra-
tion would not finance a separate DOD reserve in addition to
the NP&OSR it now has. It would not be cost effective.
Additionally, development of an independent reserve that
is not associated with the NP&OSR would be subject to annual
budget decisions by 0MB and the Congress, which would
highlight the budgetary concerns and minimize the national
security considerations. The uncertainty resulting from the
annual budget process would make effective long term
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planning extremely difficult. The long term nature of the
program makes it critical to have a meaningful long range
plan for facility development, fill, use and refill.
Without tying the DPR development to the availability of
NP&OSR revenues, there would be no built-in constraint on
DOD regarding its plans for the reserve. This could result
in much greater budget uncertainty for 0MB and Congress, as
well as greater total expenditures for the program. A
failure to tie NPR activities to DPR development will result
in continuation of the lack of a rational basis for NP&OSR
investment and production decisions. Recent decisions
regarding the NPR have been dominated by 0MB ' s interest in
maximizing near-term net revenues because there has been no
other mission for NPR. The original purpose of the NP&OSR,
to assure petroleum supplies for naval forces, as well as
the more recent objective of reducing U'. S. dependence on
imported oil, has been lost to the pressure to reduce budget
deficits. Without any objective for the NP&OSR except to
maximize near-term net revenues, there is no basis for
rational decisions on the long term exploitation of the
reserves, such as decisions regarding enhanced recovery or
oil shale development.
The second alternative of shut-in production of the NPR
to achieve a DPR would have two problems. The first problem
is that all the revenues (1.6 billion dollars) would end to
the treasury. This adverse budgetary impact is a major
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constraint that would probably prevent the NPR from being
completely shut-in. However, using portions of the 1.6
billion revenue from the NPR to convert the NP&OSR to a DPR
is a less of a constraint that possibly would be accepted
by 0MB.
The second problem is that an immediate shut-in of the
NPR would provide only a small fraction of the national
security protection of a DPR. While a DPR could provide a
drawdown rate of 1.5 mmb/d or higher, a shut-in NPR could
provide only about 0.1 mmb/d. A DPR could be built to
provide a total ready reserve of 300 mmb , 400 mmb , or more
while a shut-in NPR could provide an effective reserve of
only about 40 mmb during a year of production.
Another major constraint of shutting in the NPR is the
powerful California delegations influence in the House Rules
Committee. In October 1981, the House Armed Services
Committee approved a resolution to shut in the Reserves.
That resolution was referred to the Rules Committee and
never came to a floor vote as a result of the heavy lobbying
by the California delegation. Therefore the NPR were not
allowed to be shut in [Ref. 210].
In sum, the primary advantages of converting the NP&OSR
rather than developing a DPR independently are that it will
provide a basis for rational decisions about the long term
exploitation of the Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves,
and provide built-in incentives for efficient DPR development
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Converting the NP&OSR to a ready reserve clearly provides
much greater national security protection than shutting in
the NPR fields for use only in emergencies, and will have a
less of a budget constraint from 0MB than if the NPR were
shut-in completely. As already demonstrated, the adminis-
tration has already decided not to shut in the NPR for its
intended use as a strategic reserve because of the adverse
budgetary impacts of all revenues to the Treasury ending.
As demonstrated in the previous section, relying on the
SPR could not assure an adequate supply of petroleum to DOD
for all emergency needs. The solution then is to use some
of the revenues that the NPR is presently generating and use
these revenues to develop and build a DOD reserve that is
connected to the NP&OSR. This would be the most cost effec-
tive way of ensuring a strategic reserve exists for the DOD
and allows the government to continue to receive revenues
from the sale of Naval Petroleum Reserves.
D. STORAGE SIZE AND DRAWDOWN CAPABILITY OF DPR
The DPR should be adequate to meet all DOD petroleum
needs during a severe conventional war which is estimated to
be 600 mmb/d of crude oil. The purpose to be served by a
reserve of this size include the objective of assuring
adequate oil supplies for military activities during a war,
without taking supplies away from civilian use in the event
of an associated loss of oil from major porducing countries.
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This would help avoid pressures to find a quick but un-
desirable solution to the conflict in order to reduce the
economic and social impacts of a sharp reduction in oil
supplies. A reserve of this size also would serve the
objectives of providing a ready supply of oil for the military
during a major war without a disruption of oil imports, by
avoiding the problems in attempting to purchase an additional
1 mmb/d on the open market. The SPR would not be available
for use to help meet DOD needs if there were not a severe
supply disruption. This reserve size also could be used to
meet peacetime DOD needs in the event of a disruption
of its normal source of supplies, in order to avoid
the need to compete on the open market for its
supplies or use the cumbersome Defense Appropriation Act
procedures
.
DOD estimates that total refined product use could exceed
1.5 mmb/d during a major conventional war. Assuming that
DOD has a refined product stockpile of 30 days of supply,
about 500 mmb of refined product stocks would be needed to
provide supplies for one year. If crude oil is stored
rather than products, about 1.2 barrels of crude would be
needed to obtain each barrel of the type of refined products
required by DOD, based on recent differentials between crude
oil and wholesale product prices. Therefore, a reserve of
about 600 mmb of crude oil would be required. The drawdown
capability of the reserve under this option should be about
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1.8 mmb/d if crude oil is stored to be exchanged for 1.5
mmb/d of refined products for DOD use. Facilities would
cost about $3.0 billion for a 600 mmb reserve.
E. OIL SHALE
The DPR is an excellent conceptual plan to solve the
short term DOD problems during an oil interruption. But it
is still inadequate in coping with the long term problem of
reducing oil vulnerability through the development of
synfuels, i.e., shale oil. Shale oil production in connec-
tion with the DPR would not only help to satisfy the short
term problems but would also help to solve the long term
problem.
One potential source of energy which the United States
possesses in abundance is shale oil. It is a synthetic,
extracted from the organic material found in oil shales.
When processed, shale oil can be compared to low gravity
moderate sulfur crude, and can be refined, using existing
refining proceses, into petroleum products.
The shale oil deposits of the United States, which are
considered potentially commercially exploitable over the
next 15 to 20 years, are all located in the western part of
the country. Although oil shale can be found in 30 states,
one single formation, that of Green River, is thought to be
"the world's largest known hydrocarbon deposit" [Ref. 211].
It is located below largely unpopulated parts of Federal lands
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The oil shale formation is believed to contain 2 trillion
(2,000 billion) barrels of oil equivalent—U.S. oil needs
for 300 years at current rates of consumption.
Of this, 80 billion barrels of shale oil are thought to
be recoverable with current mining technology and above
ground processing. The major difficulties with shale oil
production are economic and environmental. The economic
aspects of shale oil production are twofold: First, there
are the costs of designing, building, and running a shale
oil mining and processing facility; second, there is the
question of product competitiveness with other forms of
energy, particularly imported oil.
F. SYNTHETIC FUELS CORPORATION
The U.S. synthetic Fuels Corporation is a Federal entity
of limited duration formed to provide financial assistance
to eligible sponsors to undertake synthetic fuels projects.
The corporation was created by the Energy Security Act,
Public Law 96-294, which was signed on June 30, 1980. The
Corporation is directed by law to limit its financial oil
shale, coal, and tar sands hydrogen. The corporation was
appropriated $17,522,000,000 dollars.
The Energy Security Act states that the purposes of the
synthetic fuels program are "...to improve the Nation's
balance of payments, reduce the threat of economic
disruption from oil supply interruptions and increase the
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Nation's security by reducing its dependence upon imported
oil." The Energy Security Act set a national goal of
producing the equivalent of 500,000 barrels of oil per day
in synthetic fuels by 1987 and 2,000,000 barrels per day by
1992. The Corporation will provide financial assistance to
projects most likely to help establish a domestic synthetic
fuels industry. To qualify for assistance, sponsors of a
project must demonstrate ability to undertake successful
design construction and operation. Financial assistance
from the Corporation is to encourage and supplement, instead
of compere with or supplant, private investment capital.
G. STATUS OF SYNTHETIC FUELS PROGRAM
U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation faces the present
dilemma of having billions of dollars to hand out and there
are no takers. More than two years after its creation, the
SFC has yet to spend any of the 17 billion dollars it was
authorized to dole out for the development of oil.
With the world recession, oil glut, and declining
petroleum prices many of the projects have been cancelled.
Exxon Corporation killed the nation's most ambitious
synfuels venture when it withdrew from the Colony Project,
a 50,000 barrel-a-day oil shale plant near Parachute, Colo-
rado. Ashland Oil, Inc., Standard Oil Company, and
Panhandle Eastern Corporation have also pulled out. The
collapse of these and other proposed projects has doomed the
SFC's original goal of producing 500,000 barrels per day of
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crude-oil equivalent by 1987 and 2 million barrels daily by
1992 [Ref. 212].
As a result, there has been an increasing opposition to
the Synthetic Fuels Corporation existence. Since the SFC
could add 13.5 billion dollars to the federal deficit by
1990, its foes— including liberals, environmentalists and
fiscal conservatives—want to eliminate the agency.
Representative Tom Corcoran (Rep. -111.) a long time opponent
of government involvement in the synthetic fuels industry
stated, "There is no economic basis today for synfuels to be
marketable in the next decade" [Ref. 213]. With the exception
of Union Oil Company, with the aid of federal price guarantees,
there are no serious projects that are presently underway.
The synthetic fuels corporation is basically a defunct
organization that has $17 billion dollars to spend and can
not do it
.
H. IMMEDIATE NEED FOR DEVELOPMENT OF OIL SHALE RESERVES
The critical question is if the development of NOSR
production would be helpful in converting and maintaining
the Naval Reserves to a ready defense reserve? (During the
past few years, the Department of Energy has been studying
the feasibility and costs of producing oil from Naval Oil
Shale Reserve No. 1 near Rifle, Colorado. A conceptual
development plan has been prepared for the development of
plants to produce up to 200,000 b/d of refinery feedstock
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from shale. The analysis of this section is based on the
information and estimates prepared for the conceptual plan.)
It is estimated that there are over 18 billion barrels
of oil in the shale at NOSR 1. It is estimated that there
are 2.3 billion barrels of oil using only shale with over
30 gallons of oil per ton, which would be the first to be
developed; this would be enough to feed a 100,000 b/d plant
for 70 years.
The strategic plan for shale oil would initially call
for a plant with the capability to produce 20,000 b/d, with
construction costs of about $1.39 billion and annual operating
costs of $185 million. Expansion to a 50,000 b/d plant has
an estimated additional construction cost of $1.8 billion,
and annual operating costs of $320 million. A 100,000 b/d
plant is estimated to cost a total of $5.7 billion for
construction, and $640 million per year in operating
costs. The first 20,000 b/d of capacity would come on line
in 7.5 years, and output increased to 100,000 b/d in 13.5
years.
I. WOULD THE NOSR BE HELPFUL IN CONVERTING THE NPR TO DPR?
If production from the Oil Shale Reserves is not
developed, revenues from the existing Naval Petroleum
Reserves would permit development of a 200 mmb DPR by 1997,
but any further expansion would be very slow. By 2010 the
DPR would be expanded only to 261 mmb, because of the sharp
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decline in net revenues from the reserves. From 2000 to
2010, fill of a DPR would average less than 10,000 b/d. The
available net revenues would limit the potential maximum
size of the DPR to less than 300 mmb. (As noted in section
6.4, the goal is 600 mmb/d).
One might argue that instead of developing oil shale
reserves to supplement the fill of DOD Reserve, why not buy
the cheap oil that is so plentiful on the market during the
present oil glut. As has been demonstrated, the glut is
only temporary and one should not depend on the continued
availability of cheap oil in ensuring our national interest
is going to be met
.
If oil shale production is not developed, there would be
severe limitations on the ability to refill the DPR in the
event of a drawdown in the late 1990 's or later. If the
military reserve is drawn down during an emergency, it could
be expected that DOD would pay at least prefemergency prices
for the oil drawn from the reserve, but this is not likely
to provide enough resources to permit a complete refill.
Oil prices are likely to increase significantly during and
after an emergency, so that additional resources will be
needed to refill the reserve. For example, if prices in-
creased by 25 percent during and after the emergency, only 80
percent of the drawdown could be replaced with the sale
revenues. If 200 million barrels were drawn down, there
would be a need to refill 40 million barrels from NPR
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resources. If oil shale production were not available, it
would take 11 years to refill the 40 million barrels at a
rate of 10,000 b/d.
Without shale oil production, NPR revenues will dwindle
down to almost nothing by 2010. It would not be possible to
continue a viable DPR expansion program, and there would be
virtually no capability to refill the DPR to its former level
in the event of a drawdown.
In sum, the long-term viability of an NPR/DPR conversion
program, including the ability to expand the DPR beyond 250
mmb and to refill the DPR after a drawdown, depends on
revenues from oil shale production. Without oil shale
production, the program will fade away. The major assump-
tion here is that as NPR are depleted, the NOSR begin to pick
up the slack. It should be noted that for the NOSR to make
a profit, the price of crude oil v/ill have to rise again.
This is a calculated risk however, this should not prevent
the government from going ahead with the plan. The initial
oil shale production is slated for 1990, if started in 1983,
when the economics of oil shale production are likely to be
very different than they are today.
J. CONSTRAINTS: FUNDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF OIL SHALE
Although oil shale production is not attractive to the
government and to private investors at the present time,
this should not preclude the government from considering
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development of the oil shale reserves. The government has
already established the Synthetic Fuels program which has
yet to spend any of its 17 billion dollars to date. The
Synthetic Fuels Corporation should encourage private
industry to develop the Navy's oil shale reserves. The
money has already been appropriated for such a development
and the need has been established for oil shale production.
Fortunately, such a situation should meet with approval of
an administration that has based our national security on
the free market forces.
The strategic long term payoffs of such a plan would be
that an oil shale production plant has been constructed
during a time that oil seemed plentiful yet would be in
great demand with short supplies in a few years. Due to the
long lead times of developing oil shale plants, the U.S.
would be in a perfect position to cope with future oil
supply disruptions because it had the foresight to plan
strategically.
K. WHAT IF OIL PRICES REMAIN LOW AND THE GLUT CONTINUES?
Developing shale oil to supplement the fill of the DPR is
predicated on the assumption that shale oil will be profit-
able to produce within ten years. This will only be
achieved if the oil glut disappears and oil prices rise
again. If the oil glut does not disappear than two alterna-




Shale oil production facilities should begin construction
immediately. In the meantime the NPR should continue
production to fund the shale oil construction. Once the
plant is completed, and if oil prices are as low as they are
in the Spring of 1983, shale oil production should be
reduced to a minimum to maintain the plants functional
ability. The purpose of this would be to retain the
capability to bring the plant on full production in short
notice to meet emergencies.
Secondly, the NPR production should be converted to fill
the DPR and cheap oil should be purchased on the open market
to supplement the fill. Once the desired level of 600
million barrels has been reached, then the NPR should be
shut in.
As prices rise, shale oil production can be increased as




This paper has analyzed the continuing threat of a
serious oil supply disruption and has determined that the
U.S. is still unprepared to meet a major interruption of oil
imports. The present oil glut was analyzed and determined
to be short range in nature. Unfortunately, the glut has
created a complacency attitude that has tended to cloud the
U.S. ability to effectively cope with an oil supply disrup-
tion.
The present administration's free market approach to
energy security was demonstrated to be ineffective in
adequately preparing both the DOD and civilian sector for an
oil crisis. Strategic stockpiling was found to be inade-
quate because the DOD was still vulnerable due to the
inability of the SPR to meet DOD surge capacity needs. As a
result, a new long term strategic plan was proposed to cope
with this problem.
The strategic plan involves using revenue from the NPR
and the Synthetic Fuels Corporation to convert the Naval
Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves into a Defense Petroleum
Reserve. Not only would the DPR solve the surge capacity
problem for the DOD, but it would also be used as a tactical
reserve in peacetime which would tend to reduce the amount
of money needed to purchase oil in the long term.
174

The development of the shale oil reserves is a necessary
requirement in assuring that the DPR can be adequately-
refilled after a large drawdown and serves the long range
purpose of being able to exploit shale oil in a timely
fashion when there is a large demand for oil and a small
supply.
The U.S. national interest can best be served by having
a strategic plan which calls for a DPR and allows the
immediate development of shale oil reserves in order that the
U.S. can mitigate to the greatest degree possible effects
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